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Critical Exchange 
 
:KR FDUHVZKDW WKH SHRSOH WKLQN" 5HYLVLWLQJ 'DYLG 0LOOHU¶V DSSURDFK WR
theorising about justice 
 
Introduction 
'DYLG 0LOOHU¶V PHWKRGRORJLFDO DSSURDFK WR WKHRULVLQJ DERXW MXVWLFH DUWLFXODWHG PRVW H[SOLFLWO\ LQ
Principles of Social Justice (1999) but informing his work up to and including the recent Strangers in 
Our Midst WDNHVSHRSOH¶VH[LVWLQJEHOLHIVDQGVHQWLPHQWV± µZKDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQN¶± to play a 
fundamental constitutive role in the development of normative principles of justice. In this critical 
exchange, Alice Baderin, Andreas Busen, Thomas Schramme and Luke Ulas subject differing aspects 
of this methodology to critique, before Miller responds. 
$OLFH %DGHULQ TXHVWLRQV WKH IRFXV RQ VXSSRVHG µIXQGDPHQWDO SULQFLSOHV¶ ZLWKLQ 0LOOHU¶V
account of what the people think. Baderin claims that Miller assumes a hierarchical relationship 
EHWZHHQSHUVRQV¶IXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOHVDQGVSHFLILFSROLWLFDOMXGJHPHQWVVXFKWKDWWKHIRUPHUFDQEH
XVHG DV D µFULWLFDO PLUURU¶ IRU WKH ODWWHr. Empirical evidence from moral and political psychology, 
however, does not bear out this hierarchical relationship: for example, rather than working up from 
IXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOHWRVSHFLILFMXGJHPHQWSHRSOHRIWHQVHHPWRµZRUNEDFNZDUGV¶DPHQGLQJWKHLr 
underlying principles to fit their surface judgements. In order to justify the prioritisation of principles 
within an account of what the people think, Miller must appeal to values external to public opinion. 
$QGUHDV%XVHQSURSRVHVDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµZKDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQN¶WKDWPRYHVEH\RQGDWDOO\
RILQGLYLGXDOV¶H[SUHVVHGRUGHPRQVWUDWHGEHOLHIVDVGHWDLOHGLQWKHHPSLULFDOVWXGLHV0LOOHUFLWHVLQ
Principles of Social Justice LQ SDUWLFXODU WR D NLQG RI µVRFLDO NQRZOHGJH¶ HPEHGGHG LQ D VRFLHW\¶V
pracWLFHVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQV8QGHUVWRRGLQWKLVZD\µZKDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQN¶FDQFRPHDSDUWIURPZKDW
given individuals think and express about justice, and it can then be possible to get a firm critical grip 
on existing individual beliefs without needing to bring in theoretical resources that the society, at a 
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collective level, does not recognise. Busen sees this as a promising route forward, but not one without 
costs. 
Thomas Schramme draws a comparison between Miller and John Stuart Mill in order to 
highlight WKHTXHVWLRQRIZKDW6FKUDPPHFDOOVµH[WHUQDOFKHFNV¶RQZKDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQN([WHUQDO
checks are kinds of normative filters, which might be either formal (concerned with the way public 
opinion is formed) or substantive (concerned with the content of that opinion). While a methodological 
approach that appeals to what the people think seemingly ought to employ only formal checks, 
6FKUDPPHVHHVLQ0LOOHU¶VDSSURDFKDQDSSHDOWRVXEVWDQWLYHFKHFNVQDPHO\DSURSHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI
WKH µQDWXUH¶ RI SDUWLFXODU social relationships. In fact, however, Schramme also understands this 
VXEVWDQWLYHFKHFNWREHVXFFHVVIXOO\LQFRUSRUDWHGZLWKLQ0LOOHU¶VDSSURDFKEHFDXVHWKHSUHFLVHQDWXUH
of social relationships is not settled definitively by the philosopher, but rather is itself up for public 
debate. 
Luke Ulas suggests that although Miller wants to test his contextualist theory of justice by way 
of appeal to data concerning what the people think, those data cannot in fact vindicate the theory; they 
do not necessarily shRZWKDWµWKHSHRSOH¶WKLQNFRQWH[WXDOO\DERXWMXVWLFHVLQFHWKH\DUHDOVRFRQVLVWHQW
with disagreement about justice at a fundamental level. Moreover, even if we grant that the data do 
VXFFHVVIXOO\ WHVW 0LOOHU¶V WKHRU\ LW GRHV QRW IROORZ WKDW DJUHHPHQW Dbout justice at the level of 
fundamental principle will lead to agreement at the level of political prescription. If, on the other hand, 
ZHFRXQWHQDQFHWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWZKDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQNLVQRWZKDWLVFRQWDLQHGLQ0LOOHU¶VWKHRU\
Ulas claims that LWZRXOGQRWEHFOHDUKRZWRSURFHHGVLQFH0LOOHU¶VDSSURDFKVHHPVERWKWRDSSHDOWR
the constitutive value of what the people think, and to consider there to be independent reasons to think 
contextually about justice. 
In responding, Miller clarifies aspects of his approach, reaffirming his commitment to appeal 
to what the people think in doing political philosophy, and contrasting this with a flawed but popular 
µ$UPFKDLU9LHZ¶RIWKHSUDFWLFHLQZKLFKSKLORVRSKHUVVXSSRVHGO\µFRPHIXOO\HTXLSSHG¶WRGHWermine 
how political concepts ought to be understood and applied. The Armchair View cannot explain why 
SKLORVRSKHUVGLVDJUHHDQGLWFDQQRWSURWHFWDJDLQVWELDVHV:KLOH0LOOHU¶VDSSURDFKLQHYLWDEO\KDVDQ
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µ$UPFKDLUFRPSRQHQW¶LQKLVLQLWLDOGHYHORSPHQWRf a theory of justice, the confirmation of that theory 
by way of public beliefs avoids the shortcomings of the Armchair View. 
 
Prioritising principles 
Whilst DSSHDOVWRµZKDWSHRSOHWKLQN¶DUHFRPPRQSODFHLQSROLWLFDOWKHRU\V\VWHPDWLFWUHDWPHQWVRI
evidence about popular attitudes are rarer ± as is deeper reflection on the rationale for engaging with 
SXEOLFRSLQLRQ'DYLG0LOOHU¶VZRUNLV WKHPRVWQRWDEOHH[Feption to this pattern (especially Miller, 
1999, Chapter 3).1 Miller has integrated theorising about social justice with a wide range of data about 
popular attitudes, as well as discussed at length the value of an empirically informed approach. Here I 
focuVRQRQHNH\IHDWXUHRI0LOOHU¶VWUHDWPHQWRISXEOLFRSLQLRQKLVFODLPWKDWSROLWLFDOWKHRULVWVVKRXOG
XQFRYHUWKHµIXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOHV¶WKDWVWUXFWXUHFRPPRQDWWLWXGHV0LOOHUS,VXJJHVWWKDW
the prioritisation of general principles over VSHFLILFMXGJHPHQWVSOD\VDNH\UROHLQ0LOOHU¶VDFFRXQW
Specifically, it seems to offer an appealing strategy for reconciling an interpretive approach to political 
WKHRU\ZLWKWKHFULWLFDOSXUSRVHRIWKHRULVLQJDERXWMXVWLFH2Q0LOOHU¶VDFFRXQWZHFDQselect among 
the diverse components of public opinion and correct popular errors or biases, whilst remaining within 
the parameters set by its most basic commitments. In other words, we use public opinion as a critical 
mirror on itself. This strategy is initially appealing: if we care about public attitudes, surely what should 
FRXQWDUHSHRSOH¶VPRVWJHQHUDODQGIXQGDPHQWDOEHOLHIV 
+RZHYHU , DUJXH WKDW 0LOOHU¶V DSSURDFK LV XOWLPDWHO\ IODZHG EHFDXVH LW UHVWV RQ VRPH
problematic empirical assumptions about the shape of public attitudes. Specifically, Miller assumes a 
hierarchical picture of public opinion in which general principles play a foundational role, when recent 
work in moral psychology shows that principles, specific judgements and empirical beliefs combine in 
more complex ways to structure popular attitudes. In prioritising principles over concrete judgements, 
without regard to empirical evidence about which is psychologically more basic, Miller implicitly relies 
                                                          
1
 Other important exceptions are Swift, 2003; Walzer, 1994 and 2007; Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007. 
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on normative commitments that are independent of public opinion. The contribution proceeds in three 
SDUWV)LUVW,QRWHWKHFRPSOH[UROHWKDWSXEOLFRSLQLRQSOD\VLQ0LOOHU¶VZRUNDQGFODULI\WKHIRFXVRI
WKLV FRQWULEXWLRQ 6HFRQGO\ , VKRZ KRZ 0LOOHU¶V WUHDWPHQW RI SXEOLF RSLQLRQ SULRULWLVes general 
principles over specific judgements. Finally, I argue that this move rests on an empirically problematic 
picture of the shape of popular attitudes. 
7KUHHPHWKRGRORJLFDOLGHDVDUHRIFHQWUDOLPSRUWDQFHWR0LOOHU¶VZRUNDQGUHFXUWKURXJKRXWKLV
writings on justice and nationality. First, he emphasizes the need for a theory of social justice to be 
LQIRUPHGE\SRSXODUDWWLWXGHV6HFRQGO\KHDUJXHVWKDWMXVWLFHLVSOXUDODQGFRQWH[WXDOµWKHUHOHYDQW
principle will depend on what is being distributed, by whom, and among whom: especially on the kind 
RIUHODWLRQVKLSWKDWH[LVWVEHWZHHQWKHSHRSOHDPRQJZKRPWKHGLVWULEXWLRQLVRFFXUULQJ¶0LOOHU
p. 14). Thirdly, he underlines that a theory of justice should offer feasible prescriptions for real world 
SROLWLFVLWPXVWEHPRUHWKDQµDSLHFHRIXWRSLDQZLVKIXOWKLQNLQJ¶0LOOHUS6HHDOVR0LOOHU
2013). 
7KXV0LOOHU¶VFRPPLWPHQW WRSXEOLFRSLQLRQLVFORVHO\ LQWHUWZLQHGZLWKERWKKLVFRQWH[WXDO
pluralism and a concern with political feasibility. In Principles of Social Justice, the overall direction 
of argument seems to run from empirical evidence about public opinion to a pluralist account of the 
demands of justice. In other words, a theory of social justice should take a pluralist form in order to 
reflect the shape of popular attitudes. However, in more recent work, Miller places less emphasis on 
public opinion as the foundation for his pluralist theory (for example, Miller, 2007, Introduction). For 
the purposes of this contribution, I foFXVRQWKRVHPRPHQWVLQ0LOOHU¶VZRUNLQZKLFKWKHFRPPLWPHQW
to public opinion is basic. On this account, the role of a theory of social justice is to render popular 
YLHZVFRQVLVWHQWDQGFRKHUHQWµDWKHRU\RIMXVWLFHEULQJVRXWWKHGHHSVWUXFWXUHRIDVHt of everyday 
EHOLHIVWKDWRQWKHVXUIDFHDUHWRVRPHGHJUHHDPELJXRXVFRQIXVHGDQGFRQWUDGLFWRU\¶0LOOHU
p. 51). In other words, political theorists are engaged in an essentially interpretive exercise whose 
parameters are set by popular views. 
It is important to distinguish this view of the status of public opinion from an epistemic account, 
on which public opinion is a useful tool for helping us to get closer to a truth about justice that is 
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ultimately independent of what people think. Instead, the claim is that popular attitudes, suitably 
corrected or edited, are constitutive of the demands of social justice (on the epistemic/constitutive 
distinction, see Swift, 2003). This constitutive view can usefully be seen as a member of the broader 
family of idealising response-dependence theories of moral value. Such theories maintain that moral 
values are constituted or brought into being by human attitudes or responses. At the same time, however, 
they eschew a crude or simple form of subjectivism, because they insist that only some attitudes or 
responses count: those formed under specific conditions or free from certain biases or empirical errors 
(for example, Johnston, 1989). 
7KHSURPLVHRI0LOOHU¶VDSSURDFK OLHVLQFRPELQLQJDQ LQWHUSUHWLYHPHWKRGZLth the critical 
stance of theory in relation to prevailing beliefs. But, as with other idealising response-dependence 
theories, challenges arise in steering this middle course. First, there is a problem of disagreement. Given 
a complex set of competing ideas about what is just, rather than a singular public opinion, how are we 
to identify the attitudes that purportedly constitute the correct normative account? Secondly, what are 
we to say to cases of widespread public support for abhorrent practices such as slavery? If public 
attitudes fix the demands of justice, on what basis do we identify these attitudes as unjust? 
7KHVHZRUULHVDERXW0LOOHU¶VDFFRXQWSDUDOOHODPRUHJHQHUDOFULWLTXHRILGHDOL]LQJUHVSRQVH-
dependence theories that has been formulated in a particularly powerful way by David Enoch (2005). 
How, Enoch asks, can we motivate the idealisation away from (or selection among) actual attitudes, 
without implicitly appealing to attitude-independent moral commitments? The most obvious answer is 
that the idealisation is needed to track the moral facts in a reliable way. However, this epistemic 
argument is not available to theorists who hold that an agent being disposed to value X or to regard X 
as right or just is what makes X valuable, right or just. Enoch draws a useful analogy here with using a 
watch to tell the time: 
The reading of the watch tracks the time ± which is independent of it ± only when all goes well ... So 
there is reason to make sure ± by idealizing ± that all goes well...Had the time depended on the reading 
of my watch, had the reading of my watch made certain time-facts true, there would have been no reason 
QRWWKLVUHDVRQDQ\ZD\WR³LGHDOL]H´P\ZDWFKDQGVHHWRLWWKDWWKHEDWWHULHVDUHIXOO\FKDUJHG,QVXFK
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a case, whatever the reading would be, that would be the right reading, because that this is the reading 
would make it right. (Enoch, 2005, p. 764) 
On the one hand, any account that treats justice as constituted by actual opinion will be extensionally 
inadequate: it will be insufficiently determinate in many cases and will leave us unable to condemn 
clearly oppressive practices in contexts in which they are widely endorsed. On the other hand, we need 
DFRQYLQFLQJUHVSRQVHWRWKHµZK\LGHDOLVH¶"FKDOOHQJHWKDWGRHVQRWLOOLFLWO\DSSeal to the ability of the 
theory to track opinion-independent facts about justice.2 
Miller is acutely aware of the first horn of this dilemma. Thus he emphasises that political 
theory should identify ways in which public opinion is incoherent, biased or empirically ill-founded. In 
particular, he argues that we can select among competing views, and disregard many exclusionary 
attitudes and practices, by seeking out the fundamental principles that underlie public attitudes. Hence 
Miller distinguishes on a numEHURIRFFDVLRQVEHWZHHQµSHRSOH¶VFRQFUHWHMXGJHPHQWVDERXWSDUWLFXODU
LQVWLWXWLRQVRUSUDFWLFHV>DQG@WKHXQGHUO\LQJSULQFLSOHVWKDWLQIRUPWKHVHMXGJHPHQWV¶0LOOHU
p. 7). Crucially, he suggests that it is the latter to which political theorists should attend in developing 
DQDFFRXQWRIWKHGHPDQGVRIMXVWLFH7KLVDSSURDFKKHDUJXHVOHDYHVµSOHQW\RIVFRSHIRUWKHRULHVRI
justice that aim to be coherent, empirically sound and impartial in ways that popular opinion often is 
not, and yet can be justified to people by appeal to basic beliefs that they already hold¶0LOOHU
p. 353). Thus, as Miller describes the task of developing a theory of justice, we must explore: 
«KRZIDUGLIIHULQJYLHZVDERXWZKDWMXVWLFHUHTXLUHVFDQEHUHFRQFLOHGE\ showing that they stem from 
shared beliefs at a deeper level. My aim in this book is to discover the underlying principles that people 
use when they judge some aspect of their society to be just or unjust, and then to show that these 
principles are coherent, both separately and when taken to together. (Miller, 1999, ix). 
+HUHZHFDQ VHH DSRWHQWLDOO\SRZHUIXO UHVSRQVH WR WKH µZK\ LGHDOLVH¶ FKDOOHQJH3XEOLFRSLQLRQ LV
comprised of multiple elements at different levels. Thus to build a theory that reflects what people really 
think, we should set aside the more superficial aspects of their views and focus on the most fundamental 
commitments. In this way, we can resolve the tensions and failings to which public opinion is often 
                                                          
2
 6HH6FKUDPPHWKLVH[FKDQJHIRUUHODWHGGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHSUREOHPRIµVXEVWDQWLYHFKHFNV¶ 
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subject, by drawing on resources from within public attitudes at a more basic level. 
One kind of worry we might have about this approach is that the general principles people 
espouse are not always morally more attractive than their concrete beliefs and practices (Galston, 1989, 
p. 125). A second objection, which I focus on here, is that public opinion does not behave in the orderly 
PDQQHU LPSOLHG E\ 0LOOHU¶V DFFRXQW 7KH IROORZLQJ SDVVDJH LOOXVWUDWHV 0LOOHU¶V YLHZ DERXW WKH
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQSULQFLSOHV IDFWV DQGSDUWLFXODU MXGJPHQWV LQSRSXODU WKRXJKW µ>3XEOLF@EHOLHIV
might rest on erroneous factual assumptions ± they might apply a principle to a situation thinking that 
it had features A, B, C, whereas in fact it has features D, E, and F (if they knew that, they would apply 
DGLIIHUHQWSULQFLSOH¶0LOOHUS6LPLODUO\0LOOHUDUJXHVWKDWLWLVLPSRUWDQWWRXQGHUVWDQG
WKHEDVHVRISHRSOH¶VGLVWULEXWLYHSUHIHUHQFHVLQRUGHU WRµKHOSXVWRSUHGLFWZKDWZLOOKDSSHQLI WKH
FLUFXPVWDQFHVDOWHURULIWKHSHRSOHZKRVHEHKDYLRXUZHDUHWU\LQJWRDQDO\VHUHFHLYHQHZLQIRUPDWLRQ¶
(Miller, 1999, p. 49). For example, he suggests that if people support inequality on incentive grounds, 
their beliefs or behaviour are likely to change in response to new information about the effectiveness of 
incentives, whereas their commitment to inequality will be unmoved if it is based instead on a principle 
of desert. 
Recent work in moral psychology points to two problematic assumptions about the structure of 
public opinion within the common-sense picture outlined by Miller. First, empirical research challenges 
the idea that our particular judgements are formed by the application of more general principles to which 
we are more firmly committed. For example, individuals will recruit either consequentialist or 
deontological principles depending on which supports their preferred moral judgement in a specific 
case (Ditto et al., 2009, p. 329). Research also shows that individuals sometimes hold firm to their 
judgements about particular cases, even when the facts of the case are manipulated so that the principles 
that purportedly justify the judgements no longer apply. For example, when asked about the morality 
of incest, people tend to say that it is wrong because it leads to harmful consequences. However, when 
presented with cases of incest that are carefully constructed such that no negative consequences can 
possibly arise, respondents continue to insist that it is wrong ± suggesting that their initial judgement 
was not, in fact, grounded in the harm-based principle brought forward to justify it (Haidt, Björklund 
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and Murphy, 2010).3 
6HFRQGO\ SV\FKRORJLFDO UHVHDUFK XQGHUPLQHV 0LOOHU¶V DVVXPSWLon that empirical beliefs 
intervene between general principles and particular judgements and are susceptible to correction that 
leads, in turn, to the alteration of the judgements. Instead, our normative judgements often shape both 
the content of our empirical beliefs and the manner in which we assess the empirical evidence. For 
example, in one study participants were given a description of a man who walked out of a restaurant 
without paying ± either because he found out his daughter had been in an accident and forgot to pay 
when leaving in a hurry, or because he tried to get away with stealing when he could. Those presented 
ZLWKWKHVHFRQGµKLJKEODPH¶VFHQDULRUHFDOOHGWKHSULFHRIGLQQHUDVVLJQLILFDQWO\KLJKHUDZHHNODWHU
with the degree of initial blame impacting the extent to which the size of the bill was exaggerated (Ditto 
et al., 2009, p. 318). More generally, research has found that people employ less rigorous standards for 
the evaluation of preference-consistent than preference-inconsistent information (Taber and Lodge, 
2006). The crucial implication of this body of evidence is that we cannot make any straightforward 
counter-factual claims about what people would think if they were to appreciate their empirical 
mistakes. To do so is to neglect the complex ways in which our normative judgements and empirical 
beliefs are interrelated. 
Moral psychologists have drawn a parallel here with the different reasoning patterns of 
barristers and judges. Miller, in the passages cited previously, assumes that public opinion operates 
according to a judge-OLNHPRGHOLQZKLFKZHµZRUNIRUZDUG¶WRFRPELQHIDFWVDQGSULQFLSOHVLQRUGHU
to reach whatever judgement they seem to support. However, a range of empirical evidence supports 
the view that we sometimes (unwittiQJO\µZRUNEDFNZDUGV¶OLNHEDUULVWHUVLQDQDGYHUVDULDOV\VWHP
µSHRSOHOLNHDWWRUQH\VRIWHQKDYHDSUHIHUHQFHIRUUHDFKLQJRQHFRQFOXVLRQRYHUDQRWKHUDQGWKHVH
directional motivations serve to tip judgment processes in favour of whatever conclusion LVSUHIHUUHG¶
(Ditto et al., 2009, p. 310). 
                                                          
3
 ,GRQRWHQGRUVH+DLGW¶VVWURQJHVWFODLPVDERXWWKHJHQHUDOLQHIILFDF\RIPRUDO reasoning. It is sufficient for the 
purposes of my argument that moral judgements are sometimes psychologically prior to any more general 
SULQFLSOHVEURXJKWIRUZDUGWRMXVWLI\WKHP7KLVZHDNHUFODLPLVDFFHSWHGHYHQE\+DLGW¶VFULWLFVVHHIRUH[DPSOH
Jacobsen, 2012). 
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Whilst recent experimental work has focussed primarily on individual ethics, there is evidence 
of similar patterns of thought in the political domain. For example, studies of US and UK public opinion 
have consistently revealed widespread hostility towards inheritance tax (IHT). Yet, at the same time, 
most people strongly espouse the value of equality of opportunity (see, for example, 
http://www.electionstudies.org). It seems then that many people fail to recognise the policy implications 
of their own deeper values. According to the model suggested by Miller, we might correct this error in 
public attitudes, whilst remaining true to public opinion at a deeper level. In other words, there is a 
sense in which the public should or would support IHT, if they properly understood the significance of 
their principled commitments. Thus the political theorist can advocate for IHT from within the terms of 
public opinion. But again empirical evidence challenges this move. For example, participants in a UK 
qualitative study often began by critiquing IHT on the grounds that it takes money away from people 
who have worked hard for it all their lives. Yet when this desert claim was challenged, by pointing out 
that inheritances represent an unearned windfall from the point of view of the recipient, participants did 
not question their position. Instead, they immediately sought some other grounds for their opposition to 
IHT, for example by shifting from individuals to families as the deserving entity (Lewis and White, 
2006, p. 27). This suggests that popular opposition to IHT may be more basic than any more general 
normative principle brought forward to justify it. 
A brief look at some evidence about the behaviour of public attitudes reveals that a hierarchical 
picture of public opinion ± on which superficial concrete judgements are shaped by the application of 
more basic general principles together with empirical beliefs, and are susceptible to change when these 
prior beliefs are challenged ± is untenable. In some cases there is evidence that the specific judgements 
are more robustly held. In other instances there simply seems to be no answer as to which of principles 
or judgements is psychologically more basic (for further discussion, see Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008). 
7KLVLQWXUQVXJJHVWVDIXQGDPHQWDOSUREOHPZLWK0LOOHU¶VLQLWLDOO\DSSHDOLQJZD\RIUHFRQFLOLQJDQ
interpretive approach to political theory with the critical function of a theory of justice. If a focus on the 
general principles that structure popular attitudes cannot be supported as an account of what people 
really think at the deepest level, then how can it be justified ± except as a claim about what they ought 
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to think? In consistently prioritising popular principles over judgments, without regard to the question 
of which is psychologically more basic, Miller implicitly relies on normative commitments that are 
independent of public opinion. 
 
,QDFROOHFWLRQRIHVVD\VH[SORULQJ'DYLG0LOOHU¶VSROLWLFDOSKLORVRSK\%HOODQGGH-Shalit nicely capture 
ZKDW0LOOHULVORRNLQJIRULQDWKHRU\RIMXVWLFHµDSOXUDOLVWLFFULWLFDODQGSUDFWLFDOWKHRU\RIMXVWLFH
WKDWQDYLJDWHVEHWZHHQWKHH[WUHPHVRIFRPSODFHQWUHODWLYLVPDQG3ODWRQLFOLEHUDOLVP¶%HOODQGGH-
Shalit, 2003, p. 8). I have argued, however, that Miller faces a serious challenge in the way in which he 
employs public opinion to steer this course. In order to avoid the first extreme, Miller must make 
idealising moves away from actual opinion. However, he then confronts the problem of adequately 
motivating this process of idealisation without implicitly appealing to a domain of response-
LQGHSHQGHQWµ3ODWRQLF¶QRUPDWLYHIDFWV,LGHQWLILHGDSRWHQWLDOO\SURPLVLQJUHVSRQVHWRWKLVFKDOOHQJH
LQ0LOOHU¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHZD\LQZKLFKpolitical theory can work up public opinion, by identifying the 
principles that underlie sometimes objectionable and often confused particular judgements. Since much 
of political theory is dedicated to the search for broad theories or principles, it is tempting to approach 
SRSXODU DWWLWXGHV LQ D VLPLODU ZD\ DQG WR ORFDWH µUHDO¶ SXEOLF RSLQLRQ LQ SHRSOH¶V PRVW JHQHUDO
commitments. However, I argued that the prioritization of principles rests on a hierarchical picture of 
the structure of public opinion that is empirically untenable. This leaves Miller unable to justify the 
priority of public principles, except by appeal to values external to public opinion. A wider message of 
the paper is that evidence about how people think, as much as what they think, is crucial in addressing 
the problem of the role of public opinion in political theory. 
 
Alice Baderin 
Nuffield College, New Road, Oxford 
alice.baderin@nuffield.ox.ac.uk 
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:KDWWKH3HRSOH7KLQN«DQG:KDWWKH3KLORVRSKHU0D\3URSRVH%H\RQG
It 
 
'DYLG0LOOHU¶VSROLWLFDOphilosophy is marked by a fundamental methodological tension, or maybe even 
a puzzle. While, on the one hand, Miller holds that political philosophy should be based on the 
QRUPDWLYH EHOLHIV RI LWV DGGUHVVHHV LH µWKH SHRSOH¶ KH VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ LQVLVWV that theories thus 
conceived are in no way relativistic or conventionalist, but may rather provide a critical perspective on 
µZKDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQN¶+RZPLJKWWKLVSRVVLEO\ZRUN"'UDZLQJRQZKDW,WDNHWREHPHWKRGRORJLFDOO\
UHOHYDQWDVSHFWVRI0LOOHU¶VZork, I will first try to show that the puzzle is real and present a detailed 
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account of it, in order to then, in a second step, offer a potential solution to the puzzle. I will end by 
discussing some methodological consequences resulting from this solution and what to make of them 
LQWHUPVRIDQRYHUDOODVVHVVPHQWRI0LOOHU¶VPHWKRG 
 
The puzzle 
Let us start with the first part of the puzzle. Miller famously argues for and accordingly identifies his 
RZQZRUNDV³HPSLULFDOO\JURXQGHGSROLWLFDOSKLORVRSK\´0iller, 2008a, p. 553). Probably the most 
prominent example of this kind of philosophy is his Principles of Social Justice (PSJ), in which he 
DUJXHV³WKDWHPSLULFDOHYLGHQFHVKRXOGSOD\DVLJQLILFDQWUROHLQMXVWLI\LQJDQRUPDWLYHWKHRU\RIMXVWLFH´
(Miller, 1999, p. 51). Yet, the fundamental belief that normative theorising must be informed by 
empirically verifiable normative beliefs of its addressees can be traced as far back as Social Justice, 
ZKHUH KH DUJXHV WKDW WKH DQDO\VLV RI SHRSOH¶V UHDO-life usage of political concepts represents an 
³LQGLVSHQVDEOH VWDUWLQJ-SRLQW´ IRU SROLWLFDO WKHRU\ 0LOOHU  S  0LOOHUKDV HODERUDWHG RQ KLV
method by variously distinguishing it from modern-day Platonism (e.g. Miller, 1999, pp. 52-53) or a 
³6WDUVKLS(QWHUSULVHYLHZ´RISROLWLFDOSKLORVRSK\ZKLFKKROGV WKDWQRUPDWLYHSULQFLSOHV VKRXOGEH
formulated by philosophers independently of any particular social or political context (Miller, 2008b, 
pp. 30-1). Miller seems to reject such methodological positions for at least two reasons. The first 
concerns the practical force a theory may possess: Miller thinks that political philosophy should 
³FRQWDLQLGHDVWKDWSHRSOHHQJDJHGLQUHDO-ZRUOGSROLWLFVFDQWDNHXSDQGDFWXSRQ´0LOOHUES
30) ± something which priQFLSOHVWKDWDEVWUDFWHQWLUHO\IURPWKHµUHDOZRUOG¶DUHH[WUHPHO\XQOLNHO\WR
achieve (cf. Miller, 2013, pp. 234-8). The second reason is epistemological: if the principles proposed 
by the philosopher are supposed to both be derived entirely independently from the real world and still 
KDYHQRUPDWLYHIRUFHKHPXVWFODLPWRSRVVHVV³DVSHFLDONLQGRINQRZOHGJHQRWDYDLODEOH WRRWKHU
KXPDQEHLQJV´0LOOHUDS± DSRVLWLRQ0LOOHUILQGV³HYHQPRUHGLIILFXOWWRGHIHQGWRGD\WKDQ
LWZDVLQ3ODWR¶VWLPH´0LOOHUSS-3). 
While all of this underlines why, for Miller, the normative beliefs of the addressees of political 
philosophy must play a constitutive role with regard to theory-building, it is precisely this 
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methodological stance which has drawn considerable criticism, and in particular charges of relativism 
or conventionalism (e.g. Swift, 2003). Miller, however ± and this leads us to the second part of our 
puzzle ± H[SOLFLWO\UHMHFWVWKLVFULWLFLVPDQGVWUHVVHVWKDWEXLOGLQJDWKHRU\RQµZKDW WKHSHRSOHWKLQN¶
does not necessarily mean taking into account any beliefs people might hold, but rather only those 
³DGMXVWHGWRWDNHDFFRXQWRIHPSLULFDOHUURUIDXOW\LQIHUHQFHVWKHGLVWRUWLQJHIIHFWRIVHOI-interest, and 
so on ± that is, the deficienFLHVWKDWDUHDOUHDG\FRPPRQO\XQGHUVWRRGWRSURGXFHHUURQHRXVEHOLHIV´
(Miller, 1999, p. 56; see also Miller, 2003b, pp. 352-357). Similarly, Miller thinks that only those beliefs 
should be regarded which ± VRPHZKDWDQDORJRXVWR5DZOV¶VQRWLRQRIFRQVLGHUed judgments ± people 
come to hold after a certain amount of self-reflection (Miller, 1999, p. 56). Even without further 
discussing these restrictions, they should sufficiently illustrate not only how, according to Miller, a 
WKHRU\LQIRUPHGE\SHRSOH¶VQRUmative beliefs may still differ considerably from those very beliefs, but 
also in which way and to what extent such a theory may provide its addressees with a vantage point for 
critical self-reflection ± even though it starts out from their very own normative beliefs. Yet, it seems 
that Miller wants to argue that in at least two ways political philosophy must be able to go even further 
EH\RQGµZKDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQN¶ 
)RU RQH WKLQJ KH LQVLVWV WKDW WKH SKLORVRSKHU VKRXOG EH DEOH WR LGHQWLI\ ZKHUH SHRSOH¶V
subjective normative judgments go amiss. In PSJ Miller argues that the principles he identifies in 
SHRSOH¶V EHOLHIV DERXW MXVWLFH DUH ³appropriate WR GLIIHUHQW PRGHV RI KXPDQ UHODWLRQVKLS´ RU LQ D
VOLJKWO\GLIIHUHQWIRUPXODWLRQWKDW³LWPXVWEHSRVVLEOHWo show that the principle is fitting or relevant 
LQ RQH VRFLDO FRQWH[W EXW QRW LQ DQRWKHU´ DQG WKDW WKLV LV LQ IDFW ³PRUH WKDQ D PHUHO\ HPSLULFDO
FRQQHFWLRQ´ 0LOOHU  SS -4, my emphasis). However, unless we assume that the social 
relationships in TXHVWLRQDUHWKHPVHOYHVFRQVWLWXWHGE\SHRSOH¶VEHOLHIVDERXWMXVWLFHDQLGHDZKLFK
Miller himself rejects as circular (Miller, 1999, p. 33)), I think this aggravates rather than eases the 
methodological tension which we started out from: For if Miller wants the connection between 
principles and social contexts to have the kind of objective normative force implied in the quotes above, 
KH ZRXOG VHHP WR KDYH WR IDOO EDFN XSRQ DQ µH[WHUQDO¶ VRXUFH RI QRUPDWLYLW\ WKDW LV RQH WKDW LV
LQGHSHQGHQWRIµZKDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQN¶FI+RQQHWKIRUDVLPLODUREVHUYDWLRQ 
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Very much the same problem also seems to be present in the second way in which Miller thinks 
SKLORVRSK\VKRXOGEHDEOHWRWUDQVFHQGµZKDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQN¶7KHSKLORVRSKHUVKRXOGEHDEOH0LOOHU 
holds, not only to critically assess the way people apply the principles they currently hold, but also to 
SURSRVHSULQFLSOHVWKDWGLIIHUIURPWKHIRUPHUFI0LOOHUES<HWLIDWKHRU\¶VQRUPDWLYH
content is to at least partly transcend the status quo RIµZKDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQN¶ZHQHHGWRNQRZZKHUH
WKHUHVSHFWLYHQRUPDWLYLW\LVFRPLQJIURP,WKLQNWKDWZHFDQVDIHO\DVVXPHWKDW0LOOHUGRHVQ¶WZDQW
to make an exception and allow for Platonic theorizing here. And, indeed, he seems to hold that even 
WKHµXWRSLDQ¶DVSHFWRIWKHRU\-EXLOGLQJVKRXOGVRPHKRZEHFRQVWUDLQHGE\SHRSOH¶VH[LVWLQJQRUPDWLYH
EHOLHIVZKHQKHVD\VWKDW³ZKDWSHRSOHQRZEHOLHYHDERXWMXVWLFHWHOOVXVDJRRGGHDODERXWZKDWWKH\
could freely come to believe, especially if we assume that the society they will be living in has many 
IHDWXUHVLQFRPPRQZLWKRXURZQ´0LOOHUES+RZHYHUWKHODVWSDUWRIWKDWTXRWHVHHPV
to suggest that here, too, Miller is referring to aspects of the societal context as potential restrictions on 
which principles ± existing or utopian ± PD\EHFRQVLGHUHGDVµILWWLQJ¶<HWLIWKLVLVWKHFDVHWKHQWKLV
raises the same questions as before, namely in what way particular forms of social relationship represent 
an independent source of normativity, and what this means with regard to the connection between 
normative principles and those relationships? 
 
The solution? 
When Miller elaborates on the connections between principles and modes of relationship in PSJ, he 
unambiguously states that thH\³DUHQRWHQWDLOPHQWV´DSDUWLFXODUIRUPRIUHODWLRQVKLSGRHVQRWORJLFDOO\
QHFHVVLWDWHDSDUWLFXODUSULQFLSOHRIMXVWLFHEXWUDWKHUPDNHVWKHODWWHU³ILWWLQJ´LQVRIDUDVWKHVSHFLILF
QDWXUHRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLS³QDWXUDOO\H[SUHVVHVLWVHOI´LQLW0LOOHr, 1999, p. 35). While I would suggest 
that we may infer from this that Miller does not ascribe any kind of inherent normativity to particular 
forms of social relationship, this still does not seem to provide us with a sufficiently clear idea about 
what prHFLVHO\PDNHVSULQFLSOHVµILW¶WKHP:HPD\KRZHYHUJHWIXUWKHUFODULILFDWLRQIURP0LOOHU¶V
FULWLFDO DVVHVVPHQW RI -HUU\ &RKHQ¶V  LQIOXHQWLDO FODLP WKDW DQ\ JLYHQ SULQFLSOH LV XOWLPDWHO\
derived from a fact-independent principle grounding it. Not sXUSULVLQJO\0LOOHU¶V$QWL-Platonism leads 
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KLPWRUHMHFWWKLVFODLPDQGWRLQVWHDGSURSRVHWKDW³HYHQWKHEDVLFFRQFHSWVDQGSULQFLSOHVRISROLWLFDO
theory are fact-GHSHQGHQW´DQGPRUHVSHFLILFDOO\ WKDWSROLWLFDOSKLORVRSK\VKRXOGWDNHLQWRDFFRXQW
and EH UHVSRQVLYH WR ³IDFWVRISROLWLFDO OLIH ± everything we know about human beings and human 
VRFLHWLHV´0LOOHUESS-31). Rather than holding that facts entail normative principles, Miller 
suggests, we may characterize the relation between the two DVRQHRI³SUHVXSSRVLWLRQDOJURXQGLQJ´
While we cannot go directly from facts to principles, the former can lend plausibility to the latter. Miller 
illustrates this by way of musing about how we might explain to someone that the fact of human self-
consciRXVQHVVJURXQGVWKHOLEHUW\SULQFLSOHDQGVXJJHVWV³7KLVLVMXVWWRUHPLQGRXULQWHUORFXWRURI
some very familiar facts about human experience, and to show how it is those facts that bring principles 
like the liberty principle into play ± if the facts were otherwise there would simply be no reason to 
SURSRVHVXFKDSULQFLSOH´0LOOHUES 
%XWKRZGR,µVKRZ¶VRPHRQHWKDWDFHUWDLQIDFWJURXQGVDSULQFLSOH",QRUGHUIRUPHWREHDEOH
to do so, it would seem that we need to ascribe the same (or at least sufficiently similar) meaning to the 
fact in question. Take, for instance, the idea that children should not be allowed to work (or at least not 
nearly the same hours as adults): while we might be able to agree on some sort of objective definition 
RIµFKLOGUHQ¶VD\DQ\RQHEHORZWKHDJHRIZKHWKHURUQRWZHDOVRILQGWKLVFODLPQRUPDWLYHO\
acceptable will depend on our respective understanding of what being a child means. This 
understanding, however, is likely to differ considerably depending on the social (and historical) context 
we are situated in ± a conclusion which I gather Miller, given his contextualist outlook, would have to 
agree with. What this implies, or so I would like to suggest, is that the grounding relation between facts 
and principles, as Miller presents it, is not objective, but rather best understood itself as the product of 
VRFLDOSUDFWLFHVZKLFKLVµVWRUHG¶LQVRFLDOQRUPVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQVDVDNLQGRIµVRFLDONQRZOHGJH¶4 As 
such, it is neither objective nor reducible to subjective beliefs. By socialization through and taking part 
in social practices, people learn what kind of meaning is ascribed to facts (and thus which principles 
WKRVH IDFWV PD\ JURXQG \HW VXUHO\ WKLV GRHVQ¶W PHDQ WKDW WKHLU VXEMHFWLYH EHOLHIV ZLOO DOways or 
                                                          
4
 For a recent attempt to develop a theory of justice based on this kind of normative foundation (and the extent to 
which this represents a Hegelian enterprise), see Honneth, 2014. 
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necessarily match what they have learned (otherwise there would, among other things, not only be no 
need to convince others of principles, but also no resources for social change). 
How might this help with our initial puzzle? First of all, I would submit that we can now give 
DPRUHSUHFLVHDFFRXQWRIµZKDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQN¶(YHQ WKRXJK WRP\NQRZOHGJH0LOOHUGRHVQRW
PDNHWKLVGLVWLQFWLRQKLPVHOI,WKLQNZHPD\VHQVLEO\GLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQµZKDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQN¶DV
some sort of average of peoplH¶V LQGLYLGXDO QRUPDWLYH EHOLHIV DV H[SUHVVHG LQ WKH TXDQWLWDWLYH
empirical studies on which Miller draws in PSJ DQG µZKDW WKHSHRSOH WKLQN¶ DV WKH NLQGRI VRFLDO
knowledge (re-)produced in social practices which I have just elaborated on (which it is certainly more 
difficult to reveal through (even qualitative) empirical studies which take individuals as their objects of 
inquiry). If I am correct in my assumption that the kind of grounding Miller posits as the link between 
facts and principles is situaWHGQRWRQWKHOHYHORILQGLYLGXDOEHOLHIVEXWRQWKHOHYHORIµZKDWWKHSHRSOH
WKLQN¶LQWKHODWWHUVHQVHWKLVSURYLGHVXVZLWKDQH[SODQDWLRQDVWRZKHUH0LOOHUJHWVWKHQRUPDWLYLW\
IURPWKDWDOORZVKLPWRJREH\RQGSHRSOH¶VH[LVWLQJQRUPDWLYHEHOLHIV(which we can now see are just 
RQHNLQGRIµZKDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQN¶E\UHIHUULQJWRWKHVRFLDONQRZOHGJHIRXQGLQWKHVRFLDOSUDFWLFHV
norms, and institutions of a society, Miller is able to both criticize individual beliefs and judgments (to 
the extent that they are incompatible with that social knowledge) and propose principles even beyond 
the ones people currently hold (to the extent that the social knowledge allows for grounding those 
principles in given facts) ± DOOZLWKRXWKDYLQJWREULQJLQµH[WHUQDO¶QRUPDWLYHFULWHULD 
Let me illustrate this by taking yet another look at the argument Miller presents in PSJ. In 
claiming that his three principles of justice correspond to three forms of relationship, Miller explains, 
KHLVDSSHDOLQJWR³QRUPVRIDSSURSULDWHQHVV´DQGPRUHVSHFLILFDOO\WRZKDWKHFDOOV³WKHµJUDPPDU¶RI
MXVWLFH¶´0LOOHUS5HFDOOWKDW,KDYHEHHQDUJXLQJWKDWZKDW0LOOHUVD\VDERXWWKHJURXQGLQJ
relation between facts and principles also describes his account of the connection between forms of 
relationship and principles of justice. Now, I submit that what Miller is referring to here is precisely the 
kind of normative social knowledge I just discussed. Miller also seems to make it clear that the 
respective norms are not redXFLEOHWRVXEMHFWLYHEHOLHIVZKHQKHFRQFHGHVWKDW³WKHUHLVQRWPXFKWKDW
FDQ EH VDLG WR VRPHRQH ZKR ZDQWV WR SU\ MXVWLFH ORRVH IURP WKHVH PRRULQJV >LH WKH ³QRUPV RI
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DSSURSULDWHQHVV´@ DQG SUHVHQW DQ HQWLUHO\ FRQWH[W-IUHH WKHRU\´ 0LOOHU  S  While the 
philosopher cannot, or so I read Miller here, prove that applying a certain principle to a given form of 
relationship is objectively wrong, he can point out that insisting on this principle runs contrary to (and 
insofar comes down to putting oneself outside of) the norms implicit in the social practices and 
institutions of the society in question. 
 
The cost of the solution 
If any of this is convincing, it might not only provide a plausible explanation of how Miller can both 
build his theory up from a strictly contextualist vantage point and justifiably claim considerable critical 
force for it, but thus also make his method more attractive to people who may, in principle, share those 
WZRGHVLGHUDWDEXWKDYH IRXQG WKHP WREH LQFRPSDWLEOH:KLOH ,¶P personally very sympathetic to 
0LOOHU¶VDSSURDFK,ZRXOGOLNHWRHQGKHUHE\EULHIO\SRLQWLQJRXWWKUHHFRQVHTXHQFHVWKDW,WKLQNFRPH
DORQJZLWKRSWLQJIRU0LOOHU¶VPHWKRG3XWGLIIHUHQWO\,IHDUWKDWVROYLQJRXUPHWKRGRORJLFDOSX]]OH
might come at a cost. 
)LUVWE\FKRRVLQJWRHPSOR\0LOOHU¶VPHWKRGWKHSKLORVRSKHUZRXOGVHHPWRKDYHWRUHVWULFW
KLPVHOIWRµLPPDQHQWFULWLTXH¶DVLWLVRIWHQDVFULEHGDPRQJRWKHUVWR0LFKDHO:DO]HUVHH
6WDKOIRUDV\VWHPDWLFDFFRXQWRIµLPPDQHQWFULWLTXH¶). To be sure, he would still be perfectly able 
to criticize and theoretically point beyond the status quo he finds in a given society. However, since, as 
we have seen, the normative foundation for this is the normativity he finds within the social practices, 
norms and institutions of the society in question, this would obviously limit the scope of his critique. 
Just how much it would limit it depends on how one deals with the second consequence I have 
in mind. While I have not really touched upon this yet LQP\GLVFXVVLRQRI0LOOHU¶VDFFRXQWRIKRZIDFWV
ground principles, a lot seems to depend on what kinds of facts we are talking about. Up until now I 
have taken the different forms of relationship Miller is talking about in PSJ WREHµIDFWV¶LQWKHVHQVH
WKDW WKH\ µH[LVW¶ZLWKLQSDUWLFXODU VRFLHWLHV+RZHYHU0LOOHUKLPVHOIYDULRXVO\VSHDNVRI³PRGHVRI
human UHODWLRQVKLS´0LOOHUSP\HPSKDVLVZKLFKVHHPVWRLQGLFDWHWKDWWKHWKLQNVWKDW
WKHVHµIDFWV¶REWDLQXQLYHUVDOO\:KDWGLIIHUHQFHGRHV this make? Given what we have heard about the 
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grounding relation between facts and principles, it seems plausible to me that facts which obtain 
universally are at least candidates for grounding universal principles (while facts which only obtain 
locally are not). This seems to be what Miller has in mind when he distinguishes between objective 
basic human needs (which on his account ground universal human rights) and much more particular 
societal needs (which ground local citizenship rights) (Miller, 2007, ch. 7). At first sight this would 
VHHPWRLPSO\WKDWWKHUHDUHLQGHHGLQVWDQFHVZKHUHWKHSKLORVRSKHU¶VFULWLTXHFDQEHXQLYHUVDOLQVFRSH
However, since Miller explicitly holds that facts do not entail SULQFLSOHVDIDFW¶VREWDLQLQJXQLYHUVDOO\
is obviously not sufficient for grounding a principle. Rather, the meaning ascribed to this fact must also 
be universal ± that is, there must be some sort of universal social knowledge of the kind I have shown 
WREHHVVHQWLDO IRU0LOOHU¶VQRWLRQRIJURXQGLQJ ,QFRntrast to the relatively straightforward task of 
showing that certain facts obtain universally, determining whether the latter is also the case seems to be 
much more difficult. Establishing whether there is indeed universal meaning ascribed to certain facts 
will, for instance, probably involve having to bring in historical, sociological, ethnographic and other 
perspectives. This is not to say that such an undertaking cannot but fail, but just to point out how much 
PRUHZRUNLVUHTXLUHGE\RSWLQJIRU0LOOHU¶s method ± LQFRPSDULVRQIRUH[DPSOHWRGRLQJµ3ODWRQLF¶
philosophy. 
Unfortunately, the third consequence I would like to point out might make things even more 
complicated. As I have already briefly mentioned, while there might be rather straightforward ways of 
ILQGLQJRXWµZKDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQN¶RQDQLQGLYLGXDOOHYHOLWVHHPVWRPHWKDWHVWDEOLVKLQJWKHVHFRQG
NLQGRIµZKDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQN¶,KDYHRXWOLQHGPD\EHFRQVLGHUDEO\PRUHGLIILFXOW$V,FDQQRWJRDQ\
further into this here, I will restrict myself to pointing out what seems to me a particularly difficult 
aspect. Even if the philosopher finds a way to establish a reliable account of the normative social 
knowledge within a society, I think that he cannot be agnostic about the way this social knowledge has 
come about. There is, after all, the very real danger that the currently dominant social norms, institutions 
and practices result from hierarchical power relations, ideology or the exclusion of certain people or 
groups ± which the philosopher runs the risk of confirming on the level of theory if he takes the social 
knowledge he finds in a society as his central source of normativity. Of course, this is by no means a 
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new methodological challenge, but has, for instance, always been at the centre of debates about the 
appropriate method for doing social philosophy (cf. Pedersen, 2012). My point here is simply that this 
FKDOOHQJHLVDOVRRQHWKDW,GRQ¶WWKLQNFDQEHDYRLGHGLIRQHRSWVIRU0LOOHU¶VPHWKRG 
Once again, I do not think that the costs attDFKHGWR0LOOHU¶VPHWKRGRXWZHLJKLWVEHQHILWV%XW
I think that in choosing our method, we should know what we are getting into ± and, given that I have 
RQO\WRXFKHGXSRQZKDW,WDNHWREHWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRI0LOOHU¶VZD\WRGRLQJSROLWLFDOSKLORVRSK\,
am not sure whether I could blame someone for taking the easy (read: Platonic) route, or at least trying 
to take a shortcut.  
 
Andreas Busen 
Universität Hamburg, Allende-Platz 1, 20459 Hamburg, Germany 
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Mill and Miller: Some thoughts on the methodology of political theory 
 
In this contribution, I want to discuss David Miller's methodology of political philosophy by way of 
relating it to ideas of another renowned philosopher, John Stuart Mill. I believe both thinkers share a 
common purpose, which is to build a more realistic and contextualised political philosophy. They 
achieve this through including empirical evidence about the normative beliefs of real people in their 
methodology. I will agree with Mill and Miller that normative theory can and indeed should be based 
on empirLFDOHYLGHQFHDERXWµZKDW WKHSHRSOHWKLQN¶+RZHYHU ,ZLOOSRLQWRXWDSRWHQWLDOSUREOHP
when allowing "external checks", as I will call them, to such normative beliefs. External checks are 
indeed needed for correcting distorted normative beliefs when using them for theoretical purposes of 
devising a normative theory. But checks might also be used to exclude unwanted substantive normative 
EHOLHIV,EHOLHYHWKDWWKLVFRXOGXQGHUPLQHWKHYHU\PHWKRGRORJ\RI³ZKDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQN´:HVKRXOG
include what the people really think, not what we as theorists like people to think. 
I would like to be as clear as possible about the philosophical problems and options here, as I 
will pursue a contentious line of thought. First, it should be obvious that people are themselves not 
always clear about what they think, especially as regards complex normative issues. In these cases, 
philosophers might not be able, for pragmatic reasons, to use the suggested methodology. More 
importantly, philosophers might also want to query what it is that the people really think. I understand 
this notion to pose a methodological problem of the social sciences. Alternatively, someone might like 
to introduce a normative requirement into the philosophical model, for instance by saying that what 
people really think has to be authentic, rational, morally valid, or something the like. However, the more 
we idealise our model towards what the people should think, the more we lose grip of our starting-point. 
The quarrel, which is also visible in the pages of this special issue, is similar to debates about different 
theories in ethics, more objectivist models versus more subjectivist (or mind-dependent) models. I will 
commit to the latter model without any further argument. I would only like to stress that an objectivist 
model undermines the very idea of the methodology under scrutiny here. It misses its point, because it 
does not require reference to what the people think. 
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In his essay Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill introduces a test that is supposed to decide between 
higher and lower pleasures (Mill, 1861: 211). If all or nearly all people who are acquainted with two 
pleasures prefer one over the other, then this is the higher, or more valuable, pleasure of the two. 
Brushing over several issues here, we might be allowed to say that Mill in effect introduces an empirical 
test for determining what is good or valuable. He grounds values on facts; facts about the evaluative or 
normative beliefs of real people. Mill himself uses the test only for a very restricted range of normative 
matters, namely those that concern basic elements of human happiness. But we can use his idea as a 
springboard for more general methodological remarks on the use of normative beliefs in the 
construction of a theory of justice. 
The philosophical debate that followed in the aftermath of Mill's considerations mirrors the 
GHEDWH UHJDUGLQJ WKH XVH RI HPSLULFDO HYLGHQFH DERXW QRUPDWLYH EHOLHIV RI ³WKH SHRSOH´ RU PRUH
specifically about justice beliefs, for generating normative principles. Many philosophers believe it is 
simply a nonsensical idea to use evidence about what people prefer or value to establish (aspects of) 
normative theories. Adam Swift, for instance, claims: "If we're thinking about what justice means ± 
really means, not 'means in contemporary debate' ± then it is a mistake to give public opinion any deeper 
or more constitutive role. (Swift, 1993, p. 19 (his emphasis)).  Swift here agrees with Jerry Cohen, who 
similarly, and repeatedly, refers to the "correct principles of justice" (e.g. Cohen, 2000, 131; Cohen, 
2011, p. 227). These philosophers believe that what people find valuable is quite distinct from what is 
really valuable. Obviously, a lot hinges on whether the two aspects ± what people find valuable and 
what is valuable ± can actually be separated. Once we undermine the belief in a reality of values or of 
DFRUUHFWFRQFHSWLRQRIMXVWLFHLQGHSHQGHQWRISHRSOH¶VHYDOXDWLRQV0LOO
VPHWKRGRORJ\ORRNVPXFK
less dubious. I will hence pursue the idea of granting findings about what the people think a constitutive 
role in normative theory, especially in political philosophy (see also Schramme, 2008). 
It should be stressed that Mill does not simply refer to facts in order to establish normative 
conclusions. He rather refers to facts about individual normative beliefs and their prevalence within a 
community. So he does not draw values from brute facts, but from evaluations of people. There is 
QHLWKHU D MXPS IURP DQ µLV¶ WR DQ µRXJKW¶ LQYROYHG QRU D GHILQLWLRQ RI QRUPDWLYH terms, such as 
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³GHVLUDEOH´E\UHIHUHQFHWRQRQ-QRUPDWLYHWHUPVVXFKDV³GHVLUHG´'HVLUHVIRU0LOODUHevidence that 
something is desirable. 
Mill is also not guilty of another error, namely that of simply taking for granted the normative 
beliefs of people. He is adamant about excluding preferences based on distortive influences, such as 
extremely detrimental living conditions. The question of how to filter actual beliefs, as it were, so that 
they can be transferred into valid evidence for establishing normative ideals, is another big issue I cannot 
adequately deal with here. At least partly it poses a pragmatic problem for the actual performance of 
such tests, which has been dealt with to some extent, if perhaps not sufficiently, in the literature on 
social justice research (Swift, 1999; Liebig & Lengfeld, 2002), and also in philosophy (Elgin, 1996). 
But it also poses the problem of how to avoid bias towards certain substantive normative beliefs, as 
mentioned at the beginning of the essay. This problem will be my concern in the remainder. 
To address the widespread objection of a mere conventionalism, criteria for assessing the 
validity of normative beliefs are required. These criteria can be formal, as suggested by Mill's attempt 
to exclude distortive influences on, say, the voluntariness or authenticity of preferences. Formal 
constraints include some facts, as well. For instance, if someone believes that we must not inflict pain 
on sentient beings, but also believes that, say, guinea pigs cannot experience harm, then this would be 
a formal error, according to my usage of the term. Checks that are external to a subjective point of view 
might also be substantive, i.e. concerned with the content of a choice. For instance, purely egoistic 
attitudes could be excluded from considerations regarding principles of justice. Now, it seems that only 
formal checks of beliefs would be preferable from the methodological point of view defended here. To 
determine the normative ideal in advance, before we actually find out what people think, would mean 
sliding back into an idealised account of theory construction. Checks are only needed to make sure that 
the empirical data, i.e. normative beliefs, are undistorted. Filters should not be used to establish the 
alleged "correct" outcome of an empirical test of normative beliefs. 
Yet there is a general problem regarding the methodology lurking here: Once we allow any 
filtering of normative beliefs in order to convert them into considered beliefs for theory construction, 
we might unwittingly introduce substantive checks, which undermine the very idea of starting from the 
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basis of actual normative beliefs in the first place. I believe it is this problem of external checks ± as I 
want to call it ± that occupies David Miller in his accouQWRI³ZKDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQN´,WLVLQGHHGD
thorny question whether formal checks can ever be enough for the construction of a plausible normative 
theory. Perhaps we cannot avoid substantive constraints, at least as far as the very basic elements of a 
normative theory are concerned, such as basic elements of happiness (Mill) or principles of justice 
(Miller). 
0LOOHU XVHV µZKDW WKH SHRSOH WKLQN¶ WR KHOS HVWDEOLVK WKUHH GLIIHUHQW SULQFLSOHV RI MXVWLFH
distribution according to equality, according to desert, and according to need. He claims that these 
principles guide people in different contexts, which vary relative to different relationships that people 
have. The principle of equality is found in the context of states, desert in instrumental associations, and 
need in communities that are based on solidarity (Miller, 1999, p. 26ff.). 
There is some ambiguity as to how those principles are derived. Either Miller wants to argue 
that relationships are the basis for principles of justice5 or that principles are derived from the normative 
beliefs of people in different contexts, i.e. in different relationships.6 This ambiguity might actually be 
desired, as it might well be both influences ± lived relationships and justice beliefs ± that determine 
normative principles. Indeed, I do believe the ambiguity is Miller's way of providing external checks 
on normative beliefs without dismissing them in favour of external criteria alone.7 He therefore wavers 
between grounding his normative principles in relationships themselves and normative beliefs about the 
adequate criteria of distribution in particular relationships or contexts. This is not a shortcoming of his 
methodology; it is, instead, an important ingredient, because Miller wants to allow for the normative 
                                                          
5
 "My aim is to identify the underlying principles of justice that spring directly from the various modes of 
UHODWLRQVKLS«0LOOHUSKLVHPSKDVLV 
6
 "What grounds do we have for asserting these connections between principles of justice and modes of 
association? We may begin by looking empirically at the judgments and behaviour of people when they allocate 
resources in different contexts." (Miller, 1999, p. 34) 
7
 "Contextualists claim that there is a relationship of appropriateness between context and principle that is 
primitive in the sense that it cannot be explained by appeal to some more fundamental principle that applies 
universally." (Miller, 2002, p. 11) 
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beliefs of people to go wrong. 
To check beliefs against relationships is not, however, simply a formal check of beliefs, for 
example in terms of their voluntariness. If people believe it would be right to, say, allocate medical 
resources on the basis of desert, they would miss an adequate or fitting criterion, because the basis of 
healthcare is not to be found in a relationship based on voluntary association.8 The specific bonds 
between people that determine principles of justice do not allow for just any possible interpretation, 
because bonds come with normative boundaries and commitments. 
Still, I would argue that Miller's methodology does not imply that there is only one adequate 
distributive principle per type of relationship. The nature of the relationship provides an external check 
of subjective beliefs about the best normative principle in this context, but it does not by itself determine 
these principles. It rather restricts the options by excluding unfitting principles of justice. If checks were 
more restrictive and would lead to one determinate answer, subjective beliefs of real people would 
actually be methodologically superfluous. Normative principles, in that case, would be the outcome of 
the right interpretation of relationships. I have argued that the nature of the relationship rather provides 
a range, but only a range, of adequate principles, which are selected according to what the people think.9 
Miller's methodology is therefore not conventionalist, in contrast to what is sometimes asserted. 
He allows for external checks of normative beliefs, and hence does not simply take normative beliefs 
IRUJUDQWHGZKHQGHYLVLQJKLVWKHRU\³:KDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQN´LVQRWIL[HGRQFHDQGIRUDOODQGLVLW
contestable through a debate about the nature and fittingness of relationships in particular contexts. 
                                                          
8
 "We can discover systematic connections between contexts and principles of justice, so that whenever we find a 
society that includes human relationships of type C, we can say that those relationships ought to be governed by 
principle P." (Miller, 2003, p. 350 (my emphases)) 
9
 "We cannot hope to show that a mode of relationship necessitates the use of a certain principle of justice; but we 
can and must establish more than a merely empirical connection." (Miller, 1999, p. 34 (his emphasis)) To be sure, 
Miller does occasionally seem to give the nature of a relationship a stronger role: "Once the relationship is defined, 
we (as competent users of the concept of justice) know the criterion by which dues should be calculated, whether 
QHHGGHVHUWHTXDOLW\RUVRPHWKLQJHOVH0LOOHUS«WKHFODLPVWKDWFRQWH[WXDOLVWVPDNHDERXWWKH
contextual validity of principles of justice are themselves objective and universal in character" (Miller, 2002, p. 
12). On these occasions, his claim sounds more like a one-particular-principle-per-type-of-relationship point of 
view. 
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Hence Miller even shows a way of including substantive external checks of subjective normative beliefs 
without undermining the methodology itself ± in opposition to the idealising methodology. In his theory, 
checks are provided by the nature of particular relationships. The interpretation of the nature of different 
relationships in different contexts is a task for political theorists, if not only for them. This allows for a 
normative theory to be in conflict with actual normative beliefs and at the same time to claim superiority 
in normative terms. Still, it would need to be possible to eventually bring people to endorse those 
theoretical, external viewpoints, as they cannot be established as normatively superior on purely 
theoretical grounds. Hence there is a (non-vicious) circularity between subjective evaluations and 
theoretical considerations.10 
But how can we ever assess whether actual beliefs or some theoretical consideration are 
preferable on normative grounds? If people come to endorse the latter, for instance a particular 
interpretation of a relationship, then there is congruence between normative theory and what the people 
think; but if they have not, or not yet, endorsed them, on what grounds could a political theorist claim 
that people's normative beliefs are wrong and ought to be changed? This seems impossible, unless we 
introduce, yet again, an independent normative criterion, which then seems to amount to a claim about 
correct normative principles, and we would be back at the point where we departed from idealised and 
less realistic theories. As long as we stay within a (non-vicious) circle of to-and-fro between subjective 
beliefs and theoretical claims, I believe we cannot assume the normative superiority of any possible 
point within this circle. Real errors in normative beliefs, within the methodology put forward here, can 
only be formal errors, such as coerced attitudes; but there cannot be substantive normative errors. To 
be sure, this does not prevent normDWLYHWKHRULVWVIURPFULWLFLVLQJSHRSOH¶VQRUPDWLYHEHOLHIVDQGWU\LQJ
to convince them otherwise. But I believe taking on this role of a public critic requires a change in 
                                                          
10
 6RLWLVDFRQGLWLRQIRUDWKHRU\¶VEHLQJYDOLGWKDWLt should be possible for people to come to accept it and live 
according to its principles. Clearly, this is not the same as saying that they must accept it now. But unless one 
thinks that as far as ethics go people are blank slates on to which more or less anything can be inscribed, it does 
constrain the content of the theory. Putting the point more positively, what people now believe about justice tells 
us a good deal about what they could freely come to believe, especially if we assume that the society they will be 
living in has many features in common with our own." (Miller, 2003, p. 352 (his emphasis)) 
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purpose: from devising a normative theory that is in line with people's beliefs here and now to a proposal 
of what people might think, if they follow the political philosopher's suggestion. The latter is a proper 
task of political theory, but it needs to be distinguished from other tasks. In other words, methodological 
concerns should be determined by purposes. In this paper, I have defended a view, which I deem to be 
LQ OLQHZLWK0LOOHU
VPHWKRGRORJ\ZKHUH³ZKDW WKHSHRSOH WKLQN´ LV WKHPRVW VLJQLILFDQW LQJUHGLHQW
when establishing normative principles for here and now. 
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$UHWKHSHRSOHWKLQNLQJZKDW0LOOHU¶VWKLQNLQJ" 
For DDYLG0LOOHUWKHMRERIWKHSROLWLFDOSKLORVRSKHULVWRXQFRYHUDQGSUHVHQWEDFNWRSHRSOH³WKHGHHS
structure of a set of everyday beliefs that, on the surface, are to some degree ambiguous, confused and 
FRQWUDGLFWRU\´ZLWKWKHDLPRISURGXFLQJ³DFOHDUHr and more systematic statement of the principles 
WKDWSHRSOHDOUHDG\KROG´,WIROORZVWKDWDWKHRU\RIMXVWLFHLVWR³EHWHVWHGLQSDUWE\LWVFRUUHVSRQGHQFH
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ZLWK HYLGHQFH FRQFHUQLQJ HYHU\GD\ EHOLHIV DERXW MXVWLFH´  S 11 The theory of justice that 
0LOOHUXQGHUVWDQGV WREH HPEHGGHG LQ WKH µGHHS VWUXFWXUH¶RI HYHU\GD\EHOLHIV LQ WKH VRFLHWLHVZLWK
which he is concerned in Principles of Social Justice (hereafter PSJ) is a contextualist one. Miller 
identifies three relational contexts, each of which have their own distributive principle. A context of 
solidaristic community (like a family or, says Miller, a nation) brings with it the distributive principle 
of need; a context of instrumental association (like a market economy) is governed by the principle of 
GHVHUWDQGWKHFRQWH[WRIFLWL]HQVKLSEULQJVZLWKLWWKHSULQFLSOHRIHTXDOLW\&DOOWKLVWKHµSULQFLSOH-to-
FRQWH[WIUDPHZRUN¶ 
The justification for taking an interpretative approach that I will focus on here is an 
epistemological one.12 For MilleU LI WKHSKLORVRSKHUUHDFKHVFRQFOXVLRQVDERXW WKHµWUXWK¶RIMXVWLFH
radically divergent from public opinion: 
«WKHQZHPXVWDVNZKHWKHUWKHFULWHULDE\ZKLFKWKHSKLORVRSKHUGLVWLQJXLVKHVWUXWKIURPIDOVHKRRGDUH
the same as those used by the ordinary person. If they are the same, why is there such a radical divergence 
EHWZHHQWKHSKLORVRSKHU¶VFRQFOXVLRQVDQGWKRVHRIWKHRUGLQDU\SHUVRQ",IE\FRQWUDVWWKHSKLORVRSKHU
appeals to different criteria, what warrant does he have for thinking that they lead to objective truth? How 
can he distinguish between a mere conviction that the truth is to be found by the method of inquiry he 
favours, and a warranted belief that this is the case? (1999, p. 52) 
These are rhetorical questions; Miller believes there are no good answers. But do the people in fact 
think what Miller thinks they think? I will here first suggest that we have reason to at least be doubtful 
about that. Moreover, even if the people do indeed endorse the principle-to-context framework, there 
remains room for dispute about what follows from the framework politically. On the other hand, if we 
suppose that there is in fact a disconnect between what the public believes and what Miller imputes to 
them, then it is not clear what conclusions about justice should be drawn, because Miller also appears 
to have independent reasons to prefer his contextualist theory. 
In PSJ, 0LOOHU UHIHUV WR HPSLULFDO GDWD WR µWHVW¶ WKH SULQFLSOH-to-context framework as an 
                                                          
11
 %XWRQO\³LQSDUW´,UHWXUQWRWKLVEHORZ 
12
 This is not the only justification ± another is related to the notion that any principles of justice the philosopher 
RIIHUVVKRXOGEHSODXVLEO\µDFWLRQ-JXLGLQJ¶VHHIRUH[DPSOH0LOOHU 
28 
 
interpretation of what the people think about justice. But at first blush, there appears to be an obvious 
problem. Miller appeals to survey data (amongst other things) in which respondents answer in a certain 
way about, for example, the place of desert in judgements about just distributions. But of course, there 
is never consensus among the respondents; for every majority that responds one way there is a minority 
that responds in a different way, however much triangulation of studies is carried out. What then enables 
WKHDVVHUWLRQWKDWµWKHSHRSOH¶WKLQNVRPHWKLQJ",XQGHUVWDQG0LOOHU¶VDSSURDFKKHUHWREHWRGUDZD
distinction between levels of disagreement. Although the data evidence disagreement among persons, 
it does not follow that those persons must be disagreeing about the principle-to-context framework; 
rather, they might simply be disagreeing about how best to categorise the context at hand, or about 
which context takes priority, while agreeing in the abstract about which distributive principles rightly 
apply to which contexts. So, for example, disagreements in the survey data about whether it is okay for 
an employee to use their influence to secure a job for a relative are said by Miller to evidence 
disagreement about whether the context that takes precedence is the familial context or the context of 
the instrumental association (1999: 36). The assertion that the principle-to-context framework itself is 
consistent with public belief then survives.13 
This however is not the only possible interpretation of the data: an alternative is that people in 
fact do disagree about the framework itself, and it is that deeper disagreement that explains the divergent 
responses. The empirical data cannot resolve this issue of their own interpretation. Surveys, for instance, 
tend merely to ask people to select from given options ± we do not thereby learn why they select the 
RSWLRQV WKDW WKH\ GR 4XDOLWDWLYH VWXGLHV LQ ZKLFK SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ WKRXJKWV DERXW MXVWLFH DUH GHHSO\
probed, and which therefore provide more insight, are unfortunately less well represented in the data 
Miller appeals to. It is possible, then, that genuine deep disagreement about principle is being 
                                                          
13
 A second possible response to the variation evident in the data is to begin by accepting the inevitable existence 
of principled disagreement, and then to make clear WKDWE\µZKDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQN¶LVPHDQWµZKDWWKHPDMRULW\
WKLQN¶7KLVVHHPVWREHKLQWHGDWZKHQ0LOOHUUHFRJQLVHVWKHH[LVWHQFHRIWKRVHZLWK³GHYLDQWYLHZV´S
24), which we might interpret as those whose beliefs about justice do not correspond to the principle-to-context 
IUDPHZRUN(YHQLIZHDVVXPHWKDWWKHQXPEHURIWKHVHGHYLDQWVLVVPDOOKRZHYHULW¶VQRWFOHDUKRZWKH\VKRXOG
UHODWHWRWKHVRFLHW\WKH\ILQGWKHPVHOYHVLQLIMXVWLFHLVFRQVWLWXWHGE\ZKDWµWKHSHRSOH¶WKLQNDQG\HW,GRnot 
think the same way, what normative authority does justice have for me?   
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inappropriately rendered as merely a series of misunderstandings about context, or disagreements about 
context priority. 
One worried about this possibility might additionally wonder why, if what the public thinks 
rightly plays a constitutive role in determining principles of justice, the empirical exercise does not 
come first, rather than only at the point at which confirmation of a pre-constructed theory is sought. 
One reason potentially to worry about the order in which Miller does things is that by the time we get 
to the hard data, there has already been considerable intellectual investment in the theory to be tested. 
And indeed, the elements of the theory sketched in PSJ can be, I think, understood to proceed from 
earlier work such as Market, State and Community WKHWKUHHHOHPHQWVRIWKDWERRN¶VWLWOHEHLQJ
exemplary of the three contexts of instrumental association, citizenship, and community. None of us is 
LPPXQHWRµPRWLYDWHGUHDVRQLQJ¶VHH$OLFH%DGHULQ¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKLVH[FKDQJHIRUGLVFXVVLRQ
might there be a type of confirmation bias at work in the interpretation of the data, that leads one to 
FRQVLGHUWKDWWKDWGDWD³VWDQGVXS´WKHWKHory (1999, p. 61), rather than simply fails to falsify it? 
Perhaps this thought gets things wrong. Miller may respond that even though it is true that he 
DOUHDG\KDGDIDYRXUHGWKHRU\EHIRUHFRQVXOWLQJWKHµKDUG¶HPSLULFDOGDWDLQPSJ, this does not mean 
that that theory was not developed in the first place via a process of social interpretation. Miller is, after 
all, a person in the world: he can claim to have developed his initial contextualist theory via an ongoing 
µVRIW¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRISXEOLFEHOLHIV and sentiments, in a more Walzerian vein: from the fact he had a 
theory before coming to consult the hard data it does not follow that that theory must have been 
constructed, in a Platonic manner, via a process of abstract reasoning divorced from existing political 
practice. And since Miller is a person in the world who cannot help but interpret society as it confronts 
KLPUHIHUHQFHWRWKHµKDUG¶HPSLULFDOGDWDFRXOGQHYHULQSUDFWLFHFRPHILUVW%XWZKLOHWKLVPD\DOO
be right, any such response would DOVRVHHPWRDPRXQWWRUHFRJQLWLRQWKDWWKHµKDUG¶GDWDLQIDFWSOD\V
a less important role in the interpretative methodology than advertised, even in PSJ. We should also 
ZDQW WRNQRZPRUHDERXWH[DFWO\ZKDW LV LQYROYHG LQ WKHSULRU µVRIW¶SURFHVVRI LQWHrpretation that 
GHOLYHUVXVWKHWKHRU\LQWKHILUVWSODFHEXWLVQRWH[SOLFLWO\FRQWDLQHGZLWKLQ0LOOHU¶VDUWLFXODWLRQRIKLV
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methodology.14 
Suppose, notwithstanding these concerns, that the principle-to-context framework is indeed an 
accurate representation of the deep structure of collective public belief. There remains the question of 
what can properly be said to follow, in terms of specific political recommendations, as an implication 
of that structure. There is significant scope for divergence on this secondary question, even assuming 
DJUHHPHQWDWWKDWGHHSHUOHYHO$QDIILQLW\FDQEHGUDZQZLWKWKHMXVWLILFDWRU\³LQWHUQDOLVP´RI%HUQDUG
:LOOLDPV)RU:LOOLDPV³$KDVUHDVRQ WR2RQO\ LIKHFRXOGUHDFK WKHFRQFOXVLRQWR2E\DVRXQG
deliberative route frRPWKHPRWLYDWLRQVKHDOUHDG\KDV´:LOOLDPVS0LOOHUPD\ZDQWWRVD\
VRPHWKLQJVLPLODUSHUKDSVµ3ROLF\2LVMXVWIRU6RFLHW\$RQO\LILWFDQEHVKRZQWREHDQLPSOLFDWLRQ
of the deep structure of belief about justice Society A already holdV¶ $V :LOOLDPV IUHHO\ DGPLWV
KRZHYHU ³WKH GHOLEHUDWLYH SURFHVV ZKLFK FRXOG OHDG IURP $¶V SUHVHQW >PRWLYDWLRQDO VHW@ WR EHLQJ
PRWLYDWHGWR2PD\EHPRUHRUOHVVDPELWLRXVO\FRQFHLYHG´:LOOLDPVS%XWJLYHQWKLV
YDULDELOLW\RIµDPELWLRQ¶DQ\ number of differing actions, potentially inconsistent with each other, can 
VHHPLQJO\EHVKRZQWROLHDWWKHHQGRID³VRXQGGHOLEHUDWLYHURXWH´IURPSHUVRQV¶H[LVWLQJPRWLYDWLRQV
(Forst, 2012, pp. 30-31). Because of this, disagreement about what any one person has an internal reason 
to do seems highly likely, even assuming agreement about the contents of the existing motivational set. 
7KHSROLWLFDOLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKHµGHHSVWUXFWXUH¶RISXEOLFEHOLHIFDQWKHPVHOYHVEHPRUHRU
OHVV µDPELWLRXVO\¶ FRQFHLYHG For instance, both Miller (1983) and Michael Walzer (1989) have 
endorsed a kind of market socialism. But this is surely not the only possible way to cash out the 
implications of the purported deep structure of public belief.15 Even if you and I both agree that the 
principle of equality applies to the context of citizenship, and the principle of desert to the marketplace, 
we might well not agree that market socialism is a necessary implication of the confluence of those two 
principles; perhaps a cap on top-to-bottom income ratios (something else with which Miller has shown 
                                                          
14
 In her review of Strangers in Our Midst, Linda Bosniak notes that the precise method of social interpretation 
0LOOHUWKHUHXQGHUWDNHVLVXQFOHDU:KLOHKHGRHVVWLOO³EULHIO\FLWH´VRPHSROOLQJDQGVXUYH\GDWDWKHUHDOVRVHHPV
WREHDPRUHJHQHUDODQGXQGHUVSHFLILHGDWWHPSWWR³LQWXLWWKH]HLWJHLVW´%RVQLDNSS-7).  
15
 As Brian Barry put it with particular reference to Walzer, ³/LNHLWRUQRW«WKHUHLVDFRKHUHQWUDWLonale for the 
SULYDWHRZQHUVKLSDQGFRQWURORI ILUPVEDVHGRQZLGHO\GLIIXVHG LGHDVDERXW WKHULJKWVRISULYDWHRZQHUVKLS´
(Barry, 1995, p. 74) 
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sympathy), even where companies stay in private hands, would be sufficient; or perhaps something 
even less ambitious might be thought to do the trick. In other words, it is again seemingly quite possible 
IRUSHUVRQVWRFRQIURQWWKHVDPHµGDWD¶± here, the principle-to-context framework itself ± and draw 
opposing conclusions about it. 
What does this mean for the normative status of any first-order political prescriptions Miller 
makes? One answer is to suppose that at this level, the philosopher does indeed have some privileged 
epistemic status, and does not need to seek correspondence with what the people think; if, on the other 
hand, the philosopher remains constrained to work within the framHRIµZKDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQN¶WKHQLW
would seem to be the case that they should resist making first-order political recommendations, because 
it is inevitable that the people will not think one coherent thing. Perhaps the best way to conceive of 
things here, however, is to treat the philosopher as a citizen contributing to political debate like any 
other, offering their own interpretation of the political implications of the shared deep structure of belief 
without any pretence or requirement that that interSUHWDWLRQLVRUZLOOHYHUEHVKDUHGE\µWKHSHRSOH¶DW
large. 
But what happens if the deep structure of public belief, as a matter of fact, and as I have 
suggested is quite possible, does not comprise the principle-to-context framework that Miller has 
produced?16 , QRWHG DW WKH RXWVHW WKDW 0LOOHU VD\V D WKHRU\ VKRXOG EH WHVWHG ³LQ SDUW´ E\ LWV
FRUUHVSRQGHQFHZLWKSXEOLFEHOLHI+HVD\VWKDW³WKHHYLGHQFH>DERXWSXEOLFEHOLHIV@LVQRWGHFLVLYHIURP
a normative point of view unless we can say something more about why a certain mode of social 
UHODWLRQVKLSPDNHVWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJSULQFLSOHRIMXVWLFHWKHDSSURSULDWHRQHWRXVH´S3DUW
RI WKDW µVRPHWKLQJ PRUH¶ LV WKH SHUFHLYHG ³ILWWLQJQHVV´ EHWZHHQ WKH FRQWH[W DQG WKH SULQFLSOH DQ
independent normative appraisal. Public beliefs, however well systematised by the philosopher, are not 
in themselves sufficient to ground justice: we must in addition find justification for why the content of 
those beliefs is appropriate. But there is a curiosity here. The QRUPDWLYHµDSSURSULDWHQHVV¶RIWKHOLQN
between a given social relationship and a given distributive principle presumably remains even if it did 
                                                          
16
 Andreas Busen and Thomas Schramme also reflect on this question in their contributions to this critical 
exchange.  
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not accord with what the people think. Indeed, as Miller has put it:  
«LWPD\WXUQRXWWKDWSHRSOHLQ>D@VRFLety that includes context C fail to apply [principle] P in 
that context; they may not only fail to govern those relationships in the way that P demands, 
they may not even recognise that P is the appropriate principle to apply. In that case, 
contextualists should have no hesitation in saying that they [i.e. the people] have got it wrong, 
WKDWWKHVRFLHW\LVWRWKDWH[WHQWUDGLFDOO\XQMXVW´0LOOHUSP\HPSKDVLV 
Contextualists simpliciter might well be able to say this, but how can contextualists who also believe in 
the constitutive relevance of public belief to justice do so? How can Miller anticipate telling a society 
WKDW WKH SULQFLSOH LW HQGRUVHV LV ³UDGLFDOO\ XQMXVW´ ZKLOH DOVR EHLQJ VFHSWLFDO DERXW SKLORVRSKHUV¶
epistemic capacity to reach QRUPDWLYHFRQFOXVLRQVDW³UDGLFDOGLYHUJHQFH´IURPWKRVHRIWKHRUGLQDU\
person? (1999, p. 52). One answer for a contextualist to offer might be that it is possible to tell a society 
it is radically wrong about a given context of justice only when there are other contexts of justice which 
WKHVRFLHW\JHWVULJKWDQGWKDWFDQH[SODLQWRWKDWVRFLHW\ZK\WKHFRQWH[WWKH\¶YHJRWZURQJis wrong 
for them,QWKDWZD\0LOOHUFRXOGPHHWKLVRZQFRQGLWLRQIRUDYDOLGWKHRU\³WKDWLWVKRXOGEHSRVVLEOH
for people tRFRPHWRDFFHSWLWDQGOLYHDFFRUGLQJWRLWVSULQFLSOHV´ZKHUHDFRPSRQHQWRIµSRVVLELOLW\¶
is that persons can be plausibly persuaded to recognise the theory on the basis of the set of beliefs they 
already hold (Miller, 2003, p. 352). 
There could, though, be no correct theory of justice that is completely divorced from what the 
people think about justice. The reason for this is that, as we have seen, the philosopher is presumed to 
have no privileged epistemic vantage point ± when philosophers reach the judgement that what the 
public believes about justice is comprehensively ³ZURQJ´WKHDSSURSULDWHUHDFWLRQLVWRTXHVWLRQWKH
ZDUUDQWIRUWKDWMXGJHPHQW7KHSHRSOHDUHDVVXPHGWREHFRPSHWHQWORFDWRUVRIDQDSSURSULDWHµGHHS
VWUXFWXUH¶RI MXVWLFHHYHQ LI as it appears, Miller is willing to allow that they may occasionally go 
partially wrong); the philosopher enters to make that structure plain, and to explicate its 
DSSURSULDWHQHVV%XWHYHQLI0LOOHUGRHVQRWWKLQNWKDW³ZKDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQN´DQGZKDW¶Vnormatively 
appropriate will come fully apart in practice, the analytic distinction is illuminating, because if, as I 
have been suggested he might be, Miller is in fact wrong about what the people think, he seemingly 
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would find himself in a dilemma: on the one hand committed to the notion that the people are essentially 
the epistemic equals of the philosopher; and on the other hand of the opinion that his contextualist 
theory of justice is normatively appropriate, when in fact the people endorse something that Miller 
seemingly considers objectively wrong. It is not clear what the way forward would be in such a scenario 
± if a correct theory of justice requires both accordance with what the people think and an independent 
ascription of normative appropriateness, could there here even be correct principles of justice? In the 
interests of protecting the methodology from having to confront this kind of difficult scenario, there is 
DOZD\VUHDVRQWREHOLHYHWKDWLWKDVQ¶WRFFXUUHG 
Luke Ulas 
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Justice beyond the Armchair17 
The four contributors to this symposium have raised a challenging set of questions about how to do 
political philosophy, and specifically about what kind of attention, if any, should be paid to public 
                                                          
17
 I should like to thank Margaret Moore for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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RSLQLRQ RU ³ZKDW WKH SHRSOH WKLQN´ , Kave wrestled with these questions repeatedly but, as the 
commentaries reveal, so far failed to provide wholly satisfactory answers. So I welcome this opportunity 
to try to say more clearly why political philosophy, and especially theories of justice, must draw upon 
the best available evidence about popular opinion on relevant matters. 
To start from a premise that I hope is uncontroversial, I assume that the aim of political 
philosophy is normative: to provide theories and principles by which existing social institutions, 
practices and policies can be appraised. This is without prejudice to the question whether the upshot of 
the appraisal is radical, reformist or conservative: political philosophy can take any of these forms. A 
successful theory has to meet a number of conditions. If it advocates reform, it needs to show that what 
LVSURSRVHGLVIHDVLEOHLVQ¶WPRUDOO\RXWUDJHRXVDQGVRIRUWK%XWSDUWRIWKHZRUNWKDWQHHGVWREHGRQH
is conceptual. The theory will recommend arrangements on the grounds that they are legitimate, 
democratic, just, freedom-enhancing etc. These concepts support normative conclusions, but they also 
have descriptive components. So when a political philosopher makes a claim to the effect that justice 
requires that practice P be replDFHGE\SUDFWLFH3¶WKLVLVDFODLPWKDWQHHGVUHGHHPLQJ7KHSKLORVRSKHU
KDVWRVKRZWKDWWKHUHDVRQVWKDWIDYRXUDGRSWLQJ3¶DUHLQGHHGUHDVRQVRIMXVWLFHDQGQRWUHDVRQVRI
some other kind. 
So how are claims like this to be redeemed? For understandable reasons, philosophers are 
naturally drawn to what we can call the Armchair View. The Armchair View holds that the philosopher, 
as a competent user of whichever language he is writing in, comes fully equipped to determine how 
various concepts are to be applied, and to grasp their descriptive components. It seems to me, however, 
that this confidence is misplaced. First, what are we to say when different Armchair Views collide? The 
occupants of the various seats announce that justice means this, freedom means that, and so on, but, as 
is so often the case, these pronouncements conflict with one another. How can we get beyond the 
disagreement, as opposed to merely adding to it? Second, political philosophers ought to be more self-
reflective than they usually are DERXWWKHVWDWXVRIWKHLQWXLWLRQVRUµFRQVLGHUHGMXGJHPHQWV¶WKDWWKH\
deploy in order to justify their conceptual or normative claims. One reason is that (in Western 
democracies anyway) their social position biases them in favour of certain views and against others: 
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like other university faculty, their political convictions are overwhelmingly liberal when measured 
against the views of the population at large.18 Another is that philosophers are inevitably tempted to 
DGMXVWZKDWWKH\WDNHWREHWKHLUµSUH-tKHRUHWLFDO¶MXGJHPHQWVWRILWWKHWKHRUHWLFDOSRVLWLRQVWKH\KDYH
already arrived at independently. To give one example, few philosophers seem willing to grant desert 
the fundamental role that it plays in popular conceptions of distributive justice. A likely explanation is 
that they have already decided that the concept is problematic, perhaps because they are convinced on 
metaphysical grounds that individuals cannot be responsible for their decisions and actions in the way 
that they would need to be for the notion of personal desert to make sense. Now such considerations 
might indeed justify adopting a strongly revisionary notion of desert, or abandoning the idea all together. 
But even if this is the right answer to give at the end of the enquiry, it ought not to influence the intuitions 
from which the philosopher begins. This would be like manipulating the data in order to hold on to a 
hypothesis to which you were already committed. But sitting in the Armchair, it is going to be very 
GLIILFXOWWRNHHSRQH¶V primary intuitions uncontaminated by prior theoretical convictions. 
The implication I wish to draw is that although political philosophy unavoidably has an 
Armchair component ± I will return to this ± there are good reasons for looking beyond the Armchair 
to vindicate conceptual claims. But where should one look? An initially plausible answer is to focus on 
shared social practices, treating these as the practical embodiment of the various concepts the 
philosopher is trying to elucidate. This seems particularly promising in the case of justice. We grasp 
how justice should best be understood by seeing its principles being deployed in various practical 
contexts. Rather than ask people what they think, we should look at the rules they have chosen to adopt, 
for example the rules they apply when deciding how to allocate goods of various kinds amongst 
themselves. 
,Q KLV FRQWULEXWLRQ $QGUHDV %XVHQ SURSRVHV PRYLQJ LQ WKLV GLUHFWLRQ WDNLQJ D VRFLHW\¶V
µSUDFWLFHV QRUPV DQG LQVWLWXWLRQV¶ DV HPERG\LQJ µVRFLDO NQRZOHGJH¶ WKDW WUDQVFHQGV WKH EHOLHIV RI
                                                          
18
 For some evidence about this in the case of American academics, see Rothman, Lichter and Nevitte, 2005. 
Among the general public 18% self-identified as liberal and 37% as conservative in 1999; for philosophers, the 
figures were 80% liberal and 5% conservative. 
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individual members, and is to that extent objective. But he also highlights some potential limitations of 
such an approach. It will not provide an adequate set of tools to criticize practices that need criticizing 
± especially since these practices may have been shaped historically by dominant economic or political 
FODVVHVLQWKHLURZQLQWHUHVWV,ZRXOGDGGDIXUWKHUSRLQWZHFDQ¶WWHOOMXVWE\ORRNLQJDWDSUDFWLFHZKDW
its guiding values are. Consider law as a central social institution. One might expect to learn a great 
deal about justice by examining legal rules and the principles that lie behind them, and up to a point this 
is indeed so. But the purpose of law is not simply to deliver justice; it is also guided by considerations 
of social stability and of economic efficiency. So if one examines tort law, say, as encapsulating a form 
of social knowledge, there can be different views (as the relevant literature reveals) about how far the 
practice serves the end of corrective justice, and how far it is concerned with the efficient allocation of 
costs between plaintiffs and defendants. In making this point, I am of course assuming that we already 
NQRZURXJKO\ZKDWµFRUUHFWLYHMXVWLFH¶PHDQV%XWLIRQHGLGQRW± if one went to tort law to find out 
what justice meant ± then one would get the wrong answer by straightforwardly extrapolating from the 
practice, in light of the multiple purposes it serves. 
Looking instead to public opinion as a source of reliable opinion about concepts like justice 
appears at first sight to avoid these problems. For, first, people very often use these concepts for critical 
purposes ± a good way to get at how people understand fairness is often through seeing what they regard 
as unfair; so this avoids the accusation that the concepts that emerge from the beyond-the-Armchair 
LQYHVWLJDWLRQDUHVLPSO\PLUURUVRIWKHVWDWXVTXR6HFRQGWKHUHLVUHDVRQWRWKLQNWKDWLW¶VIDLUQHVVWKDW
FRQFHUQV WKHP QRW VRPH RWKHU YDOXH EHFDXVH WKDW¶V WKH ZRUG WKH\ XVH to express their complaint. 
+RZHYHUPDWWHUVDUHQRWVRVLPSOH7KHHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWSHRSOH¶VEHOLHIVDERXWMXVWLFHHVSHFLDOO\
their more concrete beliefs, tend to be adaptive in nature. If asked some question about wage fairness, 
for example, they may take their cue from existing wage differentials as they perceive them. Moreover, 
the language that people use to express their judgements may not be as tightly disciplined as 
philosophers would like it to be. For example, philosophers often contrast desert and incentive 
justifications for inequality, but the public may not see the distinction so clearly. So they might agree 
that policemen, say, deserve to be paid more than shop assistants, but when asked why that was so, 
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explain that no-one would join the police unless their salary was higher. 
So it is important to recognize that in order to use public opinion to develop a theory of justice, 
we must at least start with an embryonic theory that allows us to identify and categorise the relevant 
beliefs; the Armchair cannot be dispensed with altogether. This is no more of a climb-down that a 
scientist properly acknowledging that empirical research always begins with a theory that enables the 
researcher to specify which findings will count as confirming or falsifying the theory; the important 
thing is that the theory can be falsified by the findings that emerge. In my work on distributive justice, 
I began by sketching a theory according to which justice was a plural notion, with principles of equality, 
need and desert being used in different social contexts. And I then looked at a variety of evidence about 
popular beliefs to see how far these beliefs were indeed a) pluralistic and b) related to contextual 
variation in the way I had proposed. I was able to show, IRUH[DPSOHWKDWLQJURXSVHWWLQJVSHRSOH¶V
views about distributive justice were sensitive to the character of the group they belonged to ± which 
can be experimentally manipulated in various ways ± and in the direction that the theory predicted. But 
it was not a case of the theory being straightforwardly confirmed by the evidence. For example, in cases 
where the subjects are asked to distribute resources on the basis of information about how well the 
recipients have performed at various tasks, the theory would predict that an (inegalitarian) desert 
principle would be used. This is indeed what we find, but there is also some pull in the direction of 
equality, and this needs explaining, since the relevant context is not one in which we would expect that 
principle to apply (the participants are related only instrumentally). There are various possible 
explanations, but one that seems promising appeals to the idea that equality can serve as a default 
principle even in contexts where other principles are appropriate. On the one hand, it is simple to use 
(just divide the quantity of available resources by the number of recipients) and ensures that the allocator 
cannot be accused of personal bias. On the other hand, in the face of uncertainty about who deserves 
what, it can serve as an injustice-minimising device (for the reasoning behind this, see Miller, 1999, pp. 
234-6). If these conjectures are correct, the theory needs adjusting to accommodate two forms of 
equality: principled equality, where it is intrinsically important that certain goods be shared equally by 
everyone, and default equality, where equal distribution is used as a convenient rule of thumb, but one 
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that could readily be trumped by another principle if necessary.19 
I offer this as an example of how a theory can be open to revision in the face of evidence, 
despite being used as the framework that guides the search for relevant evidence.  But how good is the 
evidence itself? Both Luke Ulas and Alice Baderin raise critical questions about this. Ulas draws 
particular attention to the problem of disagreement. If people really do disagree, fundamentally, about 
what justice requires, how can we use their beliefs to generate support for our theory?  
It is important here to analyse the kind of disagreement we may encounter when surveying what 
WKHSHRSOHWKLQN2QHFDVHZLOOEHGLVDJUHHPHQWWKDWVWHPVIURPLGHRORJLFDOELDV3HRSOH¶VPRUHVSHFLILF
EHOLHIVDERXWZKDW¶VIDLU± say in relation to pay differentials ± are very likely to be influenced by their 
social position, and the felt need this creates for self-justification. Social position also affects the 
explanatory stories people tell about worldly success and failure. Here, disagreement could be avoided 
if we were able to place people behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance. Since we cannot do that, we need 
to discount beliefs that are biased in that way, and look at what people say in cases where their own 
interests are not immediately involved. 
People may also disagree over the extent to which social practices should be guided by justice, 
or by a specific form of justice. Suppose we try to explore how people judge desert by asking them what 
criteria they would use to allocate prizes among a class of schoolchildren. It is easy to anticipate that 
some of the respondents might find the very idea of prize-giving objectionable, thinking that it would 
HQFRXUDJHVDFRPSHWLWLYHDWWLWXGHWKDWWKH\GLVOLNHDPRQJWKHFODVVPDWHV6RWKH\ZLOOJLYHµGHYLDQW¶
responses to the questions we ask, but not because they disagree about what justice would in principle 
require ± they simply think that a particular desert-based form of justice has no place in the classroom. 
The point here is that although we can ask people questions designed to elicit their sense of justice, we 
FDQ¶WJXDUantee that the answers they give will express that sense; they may respond to some other 
                                                          
19
 To illustrate, consider the practice of splitting the bill equally at the end of a meal.  If I do that with a casual 
acquaintance, it will be becDXVHZHERWKDJUHHWKDWLWLVQ¶WZRUWKWKHWURXEOHRIFDOFXODWLQJZKDWHDFKRIXVRZHV
EXWVWULFWO\VSHDNLQJLWZRXOGEHIDLUHUWRGRWKHFDOFXODWLRQ 7KDW¶VHTXDOLW\E\GHIDXOW ,I,GRWKDWZLWKP\
partner, by contrast, it will be because dividing bills equally is part of what it means for us to have an equal 
UHODWLRQVKLS7KDW¶VSULQFLSOHGHTXDOLW\ 
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feature of the scenario we are presenting to them. 
So we need to separate normative disagreement in general, which will include disagreement 
about which principles or values should count for most when practical issues are being decided, from 
disagreement about justice specifically. The question will then be how much disagreement of the latter 
kind there actually is once distorting factors such as those mentioned above have been eliminated. This 
is an empirical matter, but I am tempted to short-circuit the investigation by pointing out that we could 
not have a concept like justice unless there was broad agreement about how it should be used.20 To deny 
this, you would have to suppose that people continue to speak and argue with each other about justice, 
while simply failing to recognize that their interlocutors meant something entirely different when they 
deployed the concept. 
The conceptual agreement that is required is agreement at the level of principle, not agreement 
over practical issues. That is because, when practical issues are being debated, there are usually several 
values at stake, and much will depend on empirical questions about feasibility, about the likely effects 
of institutional change, and so. So I agree with Ulas when he says that we cannot move directly from a 
conceptual account of justice to a political proposal like market socialism. A fully-fledged political 
theory is likely to incorporate a number of prLQFLSOHVDVZHOODVDQDFFRXQWRIWKHµEDVLFVWUXFWXUH¶WKDW
will best realise those principles. Getting straight about what justice means is only a first step. 
%DGHULQPDNHVDQXPEHURIYHU\JRRGSRLQWVDERXW WKHZD\SHRSOH¶V WKLQNLQJDERXWMXVWLFH
questions is actually likely to be structured. She points out in particular that it is a mistake to see their 
more concrete beliefs as controlled by higher-level principles. However, it is wrong to suppose that 
ZKHQZHHQJDJHZLWKSHRSOH¶VEHOLHIVIURPDWKHRUHWical perspective, we are just attempting to map 
H[LVWLQJEHOLHIVDVDFFXUDWHO\DVSRVVLEOHLQFOXGLQJWKHVWLFNLQJSRLQWVWKDWSHRSOHZRQ¶WDEDQGRQZKHQ
it is pointed out to them that they conflict with some principle they say they uphold. What is being 
attempted by the philosopher is a rational reconstruction of popular beliefs ± what people would believe 
                                                          
20
 When I speak of agreement here, this is meant to encompass the idea that the concrete principles people use 
depend on the social context in which they are being deployed.  This also helps to explain why Armchair 
philosophers are liable to disagree about the meaning of justice: ignoring contextual pluralism, they promote a 
particular conception as though it exhausted justice itself, overlooking or ignoring its contextual roots.  
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if they thought their position through with due regard to logic, consistency, etc. It might be illuminating 
KHUH WRUHIHU WR'DQLHO.DKQHPDQ¶V LQIOXHQWLDl study Thinking Fast and Slow, and his idea that our 
mental processes can be divided into two systems, one that controls our immediate responses to external 
VWLPXOLDQGDQRWKHURSHUDWLQJPRUHVORZO\WKDWµWDNHVRYHUZKHQWKLQJVJHWGLIILFXOW¶&RQVLGHUone of 
.DKQHPDQ¶VH[DPSOHVWKHZD\WKDWframing can affect how we respond to choices that are substantively 
identical ± IRUH[DPSOHZKHQWKHVDPHQXPHULFDOGHFLVLRQLVFRXFKHGHLWKHULQWHUPVRIµOLYHVVDYHG¶
RU LQ WHUPV RI µOLYHV ORVW¶ .DKQHPDQ  ch. 34). Our system 2 thinking allows us to see that 
something is amiss if we find ourselves making inconsistent decisions because of framing effects. Of 
course the extent to which system 2 controls system 1 will vary from person to person, which also 
means that there is no guarantee that offering someone a rational reconstruction of their beliefs will 
persuade them to adopt it. My claim is not that once we get our political philosophy right, all citizens 
will actually accept it. My (somewhat less ambitious) claim is that they will have reason to accept it, on 
the assumption that they want to be rational, and that what is being offered makes sense of a 
considerable part of what they do actually believe. 
A question remains about the role that empirical evidence should play in validating the 
contextual theory of justice itself. The contextual theory holds when distributive decisions have to be 
made within a group, the appropriate principle to use will depend on the kind of group it is ± what type 
of relationship predominantly obtains between members. For example, in groups whose members are 
instrumentally related, justice requires that resources should be allocated according to (the relevant kind 
of) desert, whereas in groups where solidarity prevails, resources should be allocated according to need. 
Now, what is the status of these claims? They are not analytic. It is not part of the definition of an 
instrumentally-constituted group that its members enact desert-based distributions.21 That their 
distributive practice takes this form might be a sign that the group is predominantly of such a kind, but 
                                                          
21
 6HHKHUHWKHFULWLFDODSSUDLVDOE\$[HO+RQQHWKZKRVHFKDUJHLVWKDWµWKHUHVSHFWLYHSUDFWLFHFDQQRWEHGHVFULEHG
ZLWKRXWWKHXVHRIFDWHJRULHVWKDWGRQRWDOUHDG\UHIHUWRWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJQRUPVRIMXVWLFH¶+RQQHWKS
127).  I believe this charge can be rebutted.   Although a full description of what it means for a group to be 
solidaristic in nature, say, will include normative elements, such as the concern that members are expected to 
show for one another, the description need make no reference to principles of justice specifically. 
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that is another question. Nor is the connection between social context and principle of justice one of 
entailment. I cannot see any way of showing that a group within which relationships are of type T must 
on pain of self-contradiction distribute its resources according to principle P. The claim as I have stated 
it is that P is the appropriate principle for the group to use, and this claim is of a type that we are familiar 
with in other walks of life. For example, when someone behaves towards us rudely or aggressively, 
there is a range of responses to the behaviour that we regard as appropriate, though we could not 
demonstrate this to someone who was unable to see it. Now I believe that almost all of us will have the 
intuitions that bear out these claims about appropriateness, but nevertheless they cannot be self-evident. 
If matters were so clear cut, it would difficult to understand how philosophers are able to defend 
(competing) claims about justice that take a universal form ± justice should always be understood as 
equality (suitably defined) or as desert, say, regardless of context. My claim is that philosophers who 
make these claims are mistaken, but I do not suggest that they are ignoring self-evident truths. So in 
order to defend contextualism, it is necessary to appeal to empirical evidence about popular opinion in 
order to establish that there are indeed shared understandings about justice that support it. The idea is 
to show that people are practising contextualists, not that they themselves have a fully worked-out 
theory to support the judgements that they make. 
7KLVLVKRZ,ZRXOGUHVSRQGWR7KRPDV6FKUDPPH¶VFODLPWKDWWKHUHLVDQDPELJXLW\LQP\
methodological DSSURDFKWKRXJKQRWKHWKLQNVQHFHVVDULO\DGDPDJLQJRQHµ>0LOOHU@ZDYHUVEHWZHHQ
grounding his normative principles in relationships themselves and normative beliefs about the adequate 
FULWHULD RI GLVWULEXWLRQ LQ SDUWLFXODU UHODWLRQVKLSV RU FRQWH[WV¶. As a theorist, I claim that different 
principles of justice are appropriate within different forms of human relationship ± WKDW¶VDQRUPDWLYH
claim ± but then I confirm this intuition (which is not self-evident) by looking to see whether it is 
reflected in the beliefs of the people who actually inhabit those relationships. If successful, this approach 
will avoid the shortcomings of the Armchair View. If my intuitions are idiosyncratic (or class- or 
gender-biased), looking at the evidence will reveal this. 
There is no space here to consider all of the wider issues that this symposium has raised. One 
concerns the scope of a theory that is developed in the way that I have proposed. Does it apply only to 
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the societies from which the supporting evidence is drawn, or can it also be used as a critical tool with 
respect to past or present societies whose members appear to understand justice differently? Another is 
how far the proposed method is specific to justice, and how far it applies to all of the concepts we use 
for purposes of political evaluation. And yet a third is about the general aim of political philosophy, and 
whether it is essential, as I believe it to be, that its recommendations should be supported by principles 
that are accessible to the public, where being accessible means that they connect in the right way to 
beliefs that people already hold. 
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